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Kant’s Self-Legislation Procedure 
Reconsidered1 
 
Adrian M. S. Piper, APRA Foundation Berlin 
 
ost published discussions in contemporary meta-
ethics include some textual exegesis of the rele-
vant contemporary authors, but little or none of 
the historical authors who provide the underpinnings of their 
general approach. The latter is usually relegated to the his-
torical, or dismissed as expository. Sometimes this can be a 
useful division of labor. But it can also lead to grave con-
fusion about the views under discussion, and even about 
whose views are, in fact, under discussion. Elijah Mill-
gram’s article, “Does the Categorical Imperative Give Rise 
to a Contradiction in the Will?”2 is a case in point. In it, he 
takes the New Kantians3 to task for various flaws in their 
interpretation of Kant’s moral theory, to be detailed shortly. 
He concludes with a question and a suggestion. In order to 
properly dissect the first, “universal law” formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative, he argues, we first need to under-
stand “why an agent wills the universalization of his max-
                                                
1 This essay is excerpted from a longer discussion, Kant’s Metaethics: First 
Critique Foundations (in progress). Earlier versions were delivered to the 
Morality of Law: Kantian Perspectives conference at the University of Keele 
(November 2010), and the Philosophy Department at King’s College, 
University of London (February 2011). I am grateful to both audiences for 
questions and discussion. Katerina Deligiorgi provided very useful comments 
at the conference, as did Henry Allison in correspondence. I also learned 
much from discussing the issues with Garrath Williams and Sorin Baiasu. 
Two anonymous readers for Kant Studies Online have greatly improved the 
final version of this paper. 
2 The Philosophical Review 112, 4 (October 2003), 525-560. References to 
this article are paginated in the text. 
3 By which Millgram means most prominently John Rawls, Onora O’Neill, 
Christine Korsgaard, and Barbara Herman. See Millgram 552, fn. 1 for a 
sensitive taxonomy of this philosophical territory. 
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im” (549). He also suggests that in order to answer this 
question, we must recur to what Kant himself actually says 
(550). His question is a good one, and his advice on how to 
go about answering it is sound. But to take Millgram’s 
advice is to call this division of labor into question, at least 
for this case. For it demands close and sustained exegesis, 
not only of his argument against the New Kantians, but also 
– in order to assess whether and where they go wrong – of 
Kant’s text itself.  
However, close attention to what Kant actually says 
yields thirty-eight “universal law” formulations of the cate-
gorical “imperative.” Sections II and III below call attention 
to thirty-one of these that can be divided into two subsets. 
The larger subset describes a form of rational deliberation 
that Section IV argues is an application of Kant’s Regulative 
Principle of Pure Reason from the Dialectic of the first 
Critique to the special case of action. These formulations 
depict the particular manner of willing through which a 
rational being specifies what action is morally permissible 
under given circumstances. Universal law formulations in 
the smaller subset, by contrast, exhort us to cultivate this 
manner of willing as an intentional goal of deliberation. 
Sections V and VI contend that the empirical method we are 
to follow in order to achieve this goal is an application of 
Kant’s Hypothetical Employment of Reason, also from the 
Dialectic of the first Critique. This second type of formu-
lation provides an heuristic for improving our ability to de-
liberate about action as a rational being would. Each kind of 
formulation thus puts to work a different aspect of Kant’s 
extended first Critique analysis of reason in general, on a 
different aspect of reasoning about human action in partic-
ular. 
It is not possible to answer Millgram’s question without 
examining these close connections between Kant’s compre-
hensive account of reason in the first Critique and his “uni-
versal law” formulations of the categorical “imperative” in 
the Groundwork. Unfortunately, we see in Section VII that 
these connections undermine rather than support Kant’s as-
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piration to derive particular duties from universal moral law. 
They therefore subvert the New Kantian project of refining 
this aspiration into a viable decision procedure that might 
usefully claim the mantle of Kant’s authority. To this extent, 
Millgram’s objections to the New Kantians are well taken. 
However, Section VIII maintains that these first Critique 
connections also imply a weaker and therefore more power-
ful role for the two contradiction tests originally developed 
by Onora O’Neill. In this form, the tests successfully refute 
Hobbes’ Foole – and therefore, in Section IX, reveal Mill-
gram’s attack on the New Kantians as ultimately self-defeat-
ing. 
Nevertheless, this refutation of Millgram should not be 
thought to imply any claim to membership in the kingdom 
of New Kantian ends in themselves on whom Millgram 
focuses his objections. Nor does it undertake to defend the 
New Kantian interpretation of Kant. That interpretation, 
which Millgram credits Rawls with disseminating to his 
students (525), is one that Rawls himself was very resistant 
to publishing until late in his life and after considerable 
lobbying from some of them. In the mid-1970s, Rawls’s 
lectures on Kant were just that: lectures in his course on 
moral psychology that explored Kant’s texts in terms that 
illuminated, supported and amplified Rawls’s own views. It 
would have been difficult to understand Rawls’s approach to 
Kant, or even the terminology in which he discussed Kant’s 
views, without knowing what his own views were. Those 
views were strongly influenced, in turn, by the Kantian 
model of moral deliberation presented in O’Neill’s ground-
breaking Acting on Principle.4 Rawls also had great respect 
for the exegesis-based Kant scholarship from which he 
distanced his own writing,5 and he urged his students to 
                                                
4 Onora Nell (née O’Neill), Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1975). 
5 Millgram describes this exegesis-based scholarship in Kant’s moral 
philosophy as having occupied a “marginalized position … a little over a 
quarter-century ago (525).” Perhaps the more accurate term would be 
“specialized.” Since then, another useful division of labor has appeared that 
takes its cue from the first: Scholars of Kant’s texts have continued to do the 
specialized exegetical work of paying close, analytical attention to what Kant 
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study the primary texts on which that scholarship was 
based.6  
So the discussion that follows aims to take Rawls’s 
counsel, too, to heart in addressing Millgram’s objections to 
the New Kantians; and to limn an alternative, Ur-Kantian 
interpretation that avoids them. But because this alternative 
goes very much against the grain of received New Kantian 
interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy, much preliminary 
exegetical weeding and trimming, and a replanting of Kant’s 
arguments in the fertile soil of the first Critique is necessary 
even in order to state it. 7 The end result retains the structural 
core of O’Neill’s original analysis, but rejects both Mill-
gram’s arguments and also the New Kantian arguments that 
his criticize. This end result does not appear until the very 
end, however, once all the New Kantian thicket has been 
cleared away. 
                                                                                                     
himself says. At the same time, New Kantians have made Kant’s basic 
approach and themes more accessible to a wider philosophical audience. Just 
as one need not be a Bentham or Sidgwick scholar in order to be a Utilitarian, 
one no longer need be a Kant scholar in order to be a Kantian. This has 
enabled the development of views that are Kantian in inspiration and 
sensibility without needing to strictly adhere to Kant’s actual texts; I count 
my own work in metaethics among them. But as we see from close review of 
Millgram’s critique, where the New Kantian approach purports to represent 
Kant’s own views, it has also created certain problems. 
6 Indeed, it could be said that he occasionally did more than this: Rawls con-
vinced some of the students who had come to him planning to write disser-
tations in contemporary moral philosophy to write in the history of ethics 
instead. 
7 The fundamentals of this alternative pre-date Millgram’s article. See “Kant 
on the Objectivity of the Moral Law,” in Andrews Reath, Christine M. 
Korsgaard and Barbara Herman, Eds. Reclaiming the History of Ethics: 
Essays for John Rawls, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 240-
269; also at: 
http://adrianpiper.com/docs/WebsiteKantOnMorObjRwlsFstschrft(1994).pdf.  
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I. Millgram’s Critique of the New Kantians 
 
illgram’s objections are based on his rendering of 
what New Kantians call the CI-procedure (526-
531). This consists essentially in O’Neill’s con-
tradiction in conception and contradiction in the will uni-
versalization tests of the moral validity of an action, plus 
more recent emendations to O’Neill’s original analysis. 
Millgram’s very generalized account of it is accurate in out-
line, and he is careful to footnote the details and quali-
fications by which various New Kantians have supple-
mented it. So newcomers may safely consult Millgram’s 
gloss directly for a reliable generalized introduction to the 
CI-procedure (526-531). Suffice it to say here that for Mill-
gram, the trouble begins when one attempts to apply what 
he calls the test of reflexive application – the application of 
one’s theory to itself – to the CI-procedure. Millgram 
observes that “governing one’s activity by the CI-procedure 
… is, anyway when one is ‘acting from the moral law,’ itself 
an action or plan of action;” and this, he suggests, enjoins on 
one what he calls the CI-maxim:  
 
(1) When I am making up my mind what to do, I 
will act only on maxims that pass the CI- 
procedure, so as to make (morally or  
rationally) permissible decisions (531). 
 
However, he goes on to argue, it is not possible to guide all 
of one’s actions according to the CI-maxim, because the CI-
maxim requires that one understand one’s actions as 
governed by lawlike, which is to say exceptionless policies; 
whereas successful agency requires exceptions from such 
policies as a matter of principle (532). Millgram concludes 
that  
(2) [. . .] the CI-maxim gives rise to a 
contradiction in the will: one’s stake in one’s 
own agency is such that one cannot endorse 
M 
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having it undermined by being deprived of the 
exceptions that are its precondition .  .  . 
[T]hen it is forbidden to act on the CI-maxim, 
and Kantian moral theory is (at least in its 
New Kantian rendition, and stating the 
conclusion informally) self-refuting (533). 
 
Millgram supports this conclusion with decision-theoretic 
considerations: As agents, we need the cooperation of other 
agents in order to achieve our ends. We must try to achieve 
these largely in ignorance of the personal rules, policies and 
ends governing other agents’ actions, as well as of future 
changes to our own ends. These shared conditions of risk 
and uncertainty, both about others’ ends and about our own 
future ends, hold for all agents; and thus reduce the ease and 
likelihood of spontaneous interpersonal coordination. They 
therefore increase the need for agents to cooperate in achiev-
ing one another’s ends, at least to the extent of permitting 
exceptions to those rules when the costs to oneself are 
minimal (534-536). In its presupposition that interpersonally 
coordinated lawlike practices can be the outcome but not the 
precondition of self-interested rational action, Millgram’s 
critique implicitly relies on the type of game-theoretic ac-
count of the origins of interpersonal coordination defended 
by such authors as David Lewis,8 Allan Gibbard9 and Edna 
Ullman-Margalit.10 
New Kantians concede the necessity of at least seeming 
to make exceptions to lawlike rules and policies. However, 
Millgram argues that the New Kantian CI-procedure fore-
closes all of the modifications New Kantians have proposed 
in order to accommodate them. Modifying the rule by build-
                                                
8 David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1969). 
9 Allan Gibbard, “Utilitarianisms and Coordinations” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard 
University, 1971) 
10 Edna Ullman-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1977).  
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ing the exception into it will not do, because that modified 
rule itself must now satisfy the CI-procedure – often with the 
unhappy result that universalizing the exception sabotages 
the point of the original rule: Allowing a promising student 
to skip class and graduate anyway, for example, would, 
when made a universal rule, undermine academic perform-
ance among all students. “[B]ecause rational agents adjust 
their plans to take account of changes in the rules …, 
institutionalizing exceptions … amounts to what is, by 
Kantian lights, a self-frustrating plan of action (541).” In-
deed, a Revision Maxim stipulating that 
 
(3) When I run into a case that my (first-order) 
 maxim does not handle properly, I will revise 
 my (first-order) maxim to incorporate the  
 exception, so as to be able to act on rules that 
 I understand to be “provisionally universal” 
 . . . (542) 
 
fails the CI-procedure; for such rules will be too complicated 
and qualified by exceptions, first, to ascertain whether or not 
they are universalizable; and second, to know what actions 
they require (542-3). Nor will building in generic exception 
clauses rescue these modified rules, because our lack of in-
formation about their specific nature, number and frequency 
makes it impossible to formulate the universalized counter-
factual conception the internal consistency of which the con-
tradiction in conception test is supposed to evaluate (544). 
Nor can the New Kantians deny the necessity of observing 
the CI-maxim, because this would be to violate one of the 
central tenets of Kant’s moral theory, that one act not only in 
accord with the moral law, but also out of respect for it 
(546). Nor can such exceptions be excluded from the class 
of bona fide maxims on account of insufficient generality, 
without depriving the CI-procedure of the power to guide 
specific actions. Nor can what counts as a maxim be left to 
the judgment of the agent, for this gives the CI-procedure 
the structure of an imperfect duty, in which “agents [have] 
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discretion to decide when to invoke the CI-procedure as a 
constraint on their actions” (547). Millgram rather wickedly 
concludes that 
 
(4) [ . . .] if contradiction-in-the-will arguments 
establish imperfect duties, it looks as though 
we have exhibited a Kantian imperfect duty 
to violate the Categorical Imperative, and so  
that part of the position will have to go (549). 
 
Millgram’s critique of the New Kantian CI-procedure thus 
has the form of a reductio ad absurdum. Although it would 
be possible to find fault with some of its details, this would 
be mere epicycle-spinning that missed Millgram’s main 
point: Something has gone seriously wrong with the CI-
procedure, and it might be useful to recur to what Kant 
actually says, in order to ascertain both what it is and also 
whether Kant’s own analysis is subject to the same attack.  
 
 
II. Millgram’s Question 
 
o address the question of why an agent wills the 
universalization of her maxim, it is first necessary to 
look more closely at Millgram’s advice as to how to 
go about answering it. To what extent, and how closely, is 
any writer obligated to consult or adhere to Kant’s text, 
when purporting to represent Kant’s own view, rather than 
merely a Kantian view? Of course there can be no deter-
minate or conclusive answer to this question; and there is 
now a very respectable tradition of representing what pur-
port to be Kant’s own views on moral philosophy in terms 
that contain a notable paucity of citations to or direct ex-
egesis of Kant’s text. Nevertheless, just as Millgram im-
plicitly poses this question to the New Kantians, whom he 
chastises for not attending closely enough to Kant’s text, one 
can also pose it to Millgram himself. For his critique of the 
New Kantian approach is based not on his own, independent 
T 
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reading of Kant’s text, but rather on what he takes the New 
Kantians to say about it (525), which in his view is insuf-
ficient. Because Millgram’s own comments are thus also 
several removes from what Kant actually says, a certain 
amount of underbrush must be cut away just in order to 
determine whether and to what extent those comments hit 
the mark. 
For example, Millgram counsels us to ask why an agent 
wills the universalization of his maxim. His question is 
based on what both he (526) and the New Kantians describe 
as Kant’s “first” formulation of the categorical “imperative”: 
 
(5) There is only one categorical imperative, and 
it is this: (a) act only in accordance with that 
maxim (b) through which you can at the same 
time will (c) that it become a universal law 
(GMS Ak. 04:421.08-09). 11 
 
But first, passage (5) is not Kant’s first formulation of the 
categorical imperative, but rather the fourth. 12 Second, (5) is 
not cast in the imperative mood, but rather has the form of a 
                                                
11 Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Herausg. Karl 
Vorländer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1965), 42. Henceforth references 
to this work are paginated in the text according to the German Academy 
edition. The German original runs as follows: 
 
Der kategorische Imperativ ist also ein einziger und zwar dieser: (a) 
handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, (b) durch die du zugleich wollen 
kannst, (c) daß sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde. (GMS Ak. 04:421.08-
09) 
 
All translations into English are mine unless otherwise noted. 
12 See GMS Ak. 04:402.09-11 for the first, his question to the reader at GMS 
Ak. 04:403.26-27 for the second and GMS 421.03-06 for the third. All forty-
seven formulations of the so-called categorical “imperative” in the text of the 
Groundwork are listed in Appendix Table 1; I claimed thirty-two in “Kant on 
the Objectivity of the Moral Law,” op. cit. Note 7, but that was wrong. 
Appendix Table 1 numbers each formulation in order of its sequential 
appearance in the text of the Groundwork. But in the event that even this 
attempt at comprehensiveness overlooks some, I simply cite the pagination 
for each as needed for purposes of this discussion. Either alternative seems to 
me more useful than the now-standard New Kantian convention of referring 
to the First, Second or Third; or to the Formula of Universal Law, the 
Formula of Autonomy, and so on.  
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command. 13 Third, (5) enjoins, not that one will the 
universalization of one’s maxim, but rather that one will its 
universalizability, i.e. that one be able to will its univers-
alization. Fourth, (5) does not actually enjoin one to will the 
universalizability of one’s maxim, but rather to will that 
one’s maxim be universalizable. That is, passage (5) makes 
clause (c) the forward-looking intentional object of a sen-
tential rather than a subsentential or adverbial attitude ex-
pressed in clause (b). It enjoins the will to adopt as a goal 
that one’s maxim become a universal law.  
Passage (5) is not the only formulation of the categorical 
“imperative” that enjoins us to adopt the universalizability of 
our maxim as a forward-looking intentional object of the 
will. All of these passages are listed in Appendix Table 4, of 
which GMS Ak. 04:447.05-08 is discussed below in Section 
VII as passage (26). But all of these intentional-object form-
ulations raise the same question. For on the face of it, this 
feature of Passage (5) sets it in direct conflict with the 
passage that immediately precedes it: 
 
(6) But when I think a categorical imperative, I 
know immediately what it contains. For 
because the imperative, aside from the law, 
contains only the necessity that the maxim 
conform to the law, and the law contains no 
condition that limits it, nothing remains to 
which the maxim of the action shall conform 
except the universality of a law in general; 
and which conformity alone the imperative  
actually represents as necessary (GMS Ak.  
04:420.31-33, 421.01-06).14 
                                                
13 I offer an analysis of the distinction between imperatives and commands in 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 
(Berlin: 
http://adrianpiper.com/rss/docs/Rationality%20and%20Structure%20of%20t
he%20Self,%20Volume%2011-%20A%20Kantian%20Conception.pdf 
APRA Foundation Berlin, 2008), Chapter IX. “‘Ought’.” 
14 Denke ich mir aber einen kategorischen Imperativ, so weiß ich sofort, was 
er enthalte. Denn da der Imperativ außer dem Gesetze nur die Notwendigkeit 
der Maxime enthält, diesem Gesetze gemäß zu sein, das Gesetz aber keine 
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Kant’s claim here is that the categorical imperative contains 
only the necessity that the maxim of one’s action conform 
only to the universality of a law in general. It repeats his 
earlier argument in Groundwork Chapter I, that the cate-
gorical imperative is what remains after we remove from the 
will every incentive – i.e. every forward-looking goal or end 
– that could arise from following any law, namely its 
conformity to law in general; and that this must be its only 
principle (GMS Ak. 04:402.05-09).15 In both places, Kant’s 
argument is that the categorical imperative abstracts from all 
conditions and incentives of the will, leaving only what he 
describes as the “bare conformity to law in general (GMS 
Ak. 04:402.11-12)”16 of its maxims. His official definition 
of the categorical imperative as 
 
(7) [. . .] concerned not with the matter of the 
action and what is supposed to result from it, 
but rather with the form and principle from 
which it itself follows (GMS Ak. 04:416.12- 
15)17 
  
reinforces this emphasis on the bare formal structure of 
one’s maxims, and unconditional disregard of all of its 
incentives. 
But if the moral law consists merely in the conformity to 
law of the will’s maxims, without regard to any of its 
                                                                                                     
Bedingung enthält, auf die es eingeschränkt war, so bleibt nichts als die 
Allgemeinheit eines Gesetzes überhaupt übrig, welchem die Maxime der 
Handlung gemäß sein soll, und welche Gemäßheit allein der Imperativ 
eigentlich als notwendig vorstellt (GMS Ak. 04:420.31-33, 421.01-06). 
15  Da ich den Willen aller Antriebe beraubt habe, die ihm aus der Befolgung 
irgend eines Gesetzes entspringen könnten, so bleibt nichts als die allgemeine 
Gesetzmäßigkeit der Handlungen überhaupt übrig, welch allein dem willen 
zum Prinzip dienen soll, d.h. […] (GMS Ak. 04:402.05-09). 
16 […] die bloße Gesetzmäßigkeit überhaupt […] (GMS Ak. 04:402.9-11). 
17 Er betrifft nicht die Materie der Handlung und das, was aus ihr erfolgen 
soll, sondern die Form und das Prinzip, woraus sie selbst folgt, […] (GMS 
Ak. 04:416.12-15). 
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conditions, results or incentives, the imperative formulation 
of that law should not then ascribe to the will the incentive 
of universalizing its maxims. By making (c) the forward-
looking, goal-directed intentional object of (b) in the formu-
lation at passage (5) above (and others like it), Kant does 
exactly this: He exhorts me to act such that I can will that 
my maxim become universal; and thereby ascribes to my 
will as its incentive my maxim’s becoming universal – right 
after insisting that the categorical imperative “contains only 
the necessity that the maxim conform to the law [italics 
added];” and that the categorical imperative “contains … 
nothing … to which the maxim of the action shall conform 
except the universality of a law in general [italics added].” 
None of these passages that describe what the categorical 
imperative is or how it is to be recognized suggest that it 
must also include itself as an incentive of the will that 
conforms to it. Indeed, in rejecting any and all incentives as 
irrelevant to the identification of the categorical imperative, 
these passages explicitly rule this out.  
So in passages (5) and (6), taking Millgram’s advice to 
attend to what Kant actually says, rather than to the New 
Kantian account that abstracts from it, has two conse-
quences. First, it raises the possibility that Millgram’s 
question as he formulates it is a non sequitur that does not 
interrogate any actual claim Kant makes in the text. Second, 
it exposes an apparent inconsistency in Kant’s view that 
could have been ignored by declining to scrutinize his actual 
words so closely. Why does Kant first insist that conformity 
of a maxim to the moral law excludes all incentives, and 
then ascribe to the will conformity of one’s maxim to the 
moral law as its incentive? Section VII below proposes an 
explanation of this seeming inconsistency, and, in so doing, 
calls attention to another way in which both Millgram and 
some of the New Kantians have misread Kant’s self-
legislation procedure. But in order to set the stage for that 
explanation, a bit more pruning and ground-clearing is 
necessary. Above all, Millgram’s question must be reframed 
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in terms that – as he recommends – heed what Kant actually 
says. 
 
 
III. Millgram’s Question Reframed 
 
o, then: Are there any passages in which Kant does 
make something like the claim Millgram ascribes to 
him, that an agent wills the universalization of her 
maxim? There are several. In all of them, Kant prescribes 
not that I am to will that my maxim could become a 
universal law; but rather that I am to will a maxim as uni-
versal law, i.e. that I am to will a universal or universalizable 
maxim. To consider a paradigmatic one, Kant characterizes 
the principle of autonomous self-legislation as that “quality 
of the will through which it is a law unto itself (indepen-
dently of any quality of the objects of willing).” He con-
tinues, 
 
(8) (a) The principle of autonomy is thus: not to 
choose otherwise than so that (b) the maxims 
of its choice are at the same time (c) 
comprehended as universal law (d) in the 
same willing (GMS Ak. 04: 440.20-23).18  
 
Clauses (b) and (d) make the important point that a self-
legislating will does not perform two acts of willing – the 
first described by the maxim of our action, the second 
described by the universalization of that maxim; but rather 
just one: we are to will the maxim as itself universal law. 
The form of the maxim itself must be universal. So passage 
(8) tells us not what intentional object we are to will, but 
                                                
18 Autonomie des Willens ist die Beschaffenheit des Willens, dadurch 
derselbe ihm selbst (unabhängig von aller Beschaffenheit der Gegenstände 
des Wollens) ein Gesetz ist. Das Prinzip der Autonomie ist also: nicht anders 
zu wählen, als so, daß die Maximen seiner Wahl in demselben Wollen 
zugleich als allgemeines Gesetz mit begriffen sein (GMS Ak. 04:440.18-23).  
To identify an autonomy formulation as itself a universal law formulation 
would be heresy in some circles, but not in this one.  
S 
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rather how we are to will. We are to will in such a way as to 
understand our maxims as universal law. Here Kant merely 
elaborates on a point he has already made, that in rational 
willing 
 
(9) [. . .] the concept of the action in itself already 
contains a law for me (GMS Ak. 04:402.40- 
41).19 
 
Passage (8) is only one of several adverbial formulations of 
the categorical “imperative” that enjoin us to act on that 
maxim through which we can will it as a universal law; all 
twenty-four are collected in Appendix Table 5. Most occur 
later in the text than the intentional-object formulations listed 
in Appendix Table 4. A maxim through which we can will 
our action in any way at all is a motivationally effective 
maxim. A maxim through which we can will our action as 
something is one that represents the action we are motivated 
to perform in a certain way, or under a certain interpretation 
or description. A maxim through which we can will our 
action as a universal law is one that represents the action we 
are motivated to perform as itself being, containing, enact-
ing, or expressing a universal law. We need not choose 
between these possibilities right now, because Kant’s other 
formulations of the moral law develop each of them in 
depth. For present purposes, the important point is Kant’s 
insistence that rational maxims represent their actions as 
having this intrinsic structural connection to universal law, 
i.e. as being lawlike; call this the representation thesis. 
Kant’s representation thesis as stated does not specify exact-
ly what kind of connection that must be. Nor does it imply 
that it is precisely this representation of the action that 
motivates us to perform it; that argument must be made 
                                                
19 Nun ist es doch etwas ganz anderes, aus Pflicht wahrhaft zu sein, als aus 
Besorgnis der nachteiligen Folgen: indem im ersten Falle der Begriff der 
Handlung an sich selbst schon ein Gesetz für mich enthält […] (GMS Ak. 
04:402.38-41). 
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separately.20 Nor does it follow from the representation 
thesis, however, that the maxim itself must include our thus 
representing it in the formulation of its goal or purpose. That 
argument, too, would have to be made separately, and 
Section VII below takes it up in greater depth.  
What the representation thesis does imply is that a 
rational maxim requires, not any specific forward-looking 
intentional object of the will, but rather a specific manner of 
willing, whatever that object might be; i.e. in such a way that 
it is lawlike. In this case, Millgram’s question should be, not 
“why an agent wills the universalization of his maxim 
(549),” but rather why an agent wills a universalizable 
maxim; that is, why what an agent wills has the form of a 
universalizable maxim. This reading does not require a 
universalized maxim as the goal-directed intentional object 
of the agent’s will. It requires only that his will have a 
certain form and potential, irrespective of that intentional 
object.  
So we have sorted the “universal law” subset of Kant’s 
formulations of the categorical “imperative” into two 
groups: The first, intentional-object group comprising seven 
formulations (Appendix Table 4) treats the universalizability 
of one’s maxim as a forward-looking intentional object of 
the will. These are the ones that deploy the “will that” 
locution. By contrast, the second group comprising twenty-
four formulations (Appendix Table 5) treats this idea ad-
verbially, as a manner of willing that is lawlike; the formu-
lations in this manner-of-willing group often deploy the 
“will as” locution. Why Kant alternates between these two 
constructions requires explanation, and Section VII will 
propose one. But on the face of it, only the manner-of-
willing formulations are consistent with those passages – 
                                                
20 I offer such an argument in “Practical Action: First Critique Foundations,” 
in Kant und die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. 
Internationalen Kant-Kongreßes, Herausg. Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, 
Claudio La Rocca, und Margit Ruffing (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
forthcoming). 
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(6), (7), and (9) above – that identify those features of the 
categorical imperative that differentiate it from other 
principles of action, namely its lawlike form, independent of 
any and every incentive they might include. 
But in thus obeying Kant’s directive to abstract from the 
will every incentive it might have to follow any law, we also 
abstract from the will the incentive to pass the CI-procedure, 
and thus to achieve moral validity for our actions. Kant’s 
directive seems to imply a disavowal of the very foundation 
of the New Kantian project. So we arrive at another juncture 
at which we must choose between following Millgram’s 
advice to attend to what Kant actually says, and accepting 
what the New Kantians – and Millgram – have constructed 
from it. Suppose we now choose again to follow Millgram’s 
advice; i.e. to accept the consequences of what Kant actually 
says in the passages discussed above, despite the seeming 
inconsistency unearthed there. Then neither the New Kant-
ian CI-procedure, nor Millgram’s CI-maxim, nor his Re-
vision Maxim offer a satisfactory account of most of Kant’s 
“universal law” formulations of the categorical imperative. 
Millgram and the New Kantians urge us to will a particular 
state of affairs that ensures the moral validity of our maxims. 
By contrast, in passage (8) and the twenty-three other 
manner-of-willing formulations like it, Kant is urging us, 
rather, to will in a manner that ensures the moral validity of 
our maxims. Therefore, it would seem, the New Kantian CI-
procedure, Millgram’s CI-maxim, and his Revision Maxim 
should be abandoned. 
Now Millgram maintains that his CI-maxim cannot be 
abandoned, without violating Kant’s stricture that one act 
not only in accordance with the moral law, but also out of 
respect for it (546). However, passage (8) is not vulnerable 
to this argument. The German term usually translated as 
“respect” is Achtung. This word is ordinarily used in situa-
tions in which our respectful attention is being commanded; 
when we are being asked to heed some background con-
dition or state of affairs in formulating and carrying out our 
actions (for example, as the sign Achtung Stufe! instructs us 
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to mind the step as we walk through the door). It thus 
expresses a backward-looking rather than a forward-looking 
intentional attitude, and takes as an object a backward-
looking motive cause of action, or (to use Kant’s term) a 
ground, rather than its forward-looking goal, incentive, or 
purpose.21 Achtung causes me to heed the universality re-
quirement of the moral law by conforming the maxims of 
my actions to it; that is, by willing universalizable maxims 
such that “the concept of the action in itself already contains 
a law for me.”  
This manner of willing expresses respect for the moral 
law by enacting a certain quality of respectful attention to 
the way in which I formulate my maxim. First, I formulate it 
in a way that is mindful of its extended temporal applica-
bility beyond the particular action that I am contemplating at 
this moment. Second, my formulation is mindful of its 
extended spatial applicability to other possible agents con-
templating the same action at this or other times. Third, my 
formulation is mindful of the feasibility of such application 
to other agents at this or other times, whether actual or 
possible. It is sensitive to the nomological scope of my 
maxim’s spatiotemporal applicability. These three cond-
itions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for 
satisfying the representation thesis. Conjointly they explain 
how a maxim of action expresses respect for the moral law. 
None of these indices of respectful attention can be 
plausibly incorporated into the forward-looking intentional 
object of the maxim, not even as “side-constraints” we must 
strive to observe. Picture the classroom, packed with smart 
and impertinent students ready to pounce on one’s every 
word, not only in order to absorb and quote them back on 
the next exam, but also to disruptively dispute them if 
clumsily expressed. Consider the impact of one’s awareness 
of these students on the care with which one formulates a 
                                                
21 I defend the distinction between backward-looking motives and forward-
looking purposes in “Moral Theory and Moral Alienation,” The Journal of 
Philosophy LXXXIV, 2 (February 1987), 102-118. 
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difficult point in lecture. Certainly one strives to get the point 
right. But is it therefore plausible to describe the rapt and 
vigilant students as “side-constraints” on one’s formulation 
of this point that one also strives to observe? Of course not. 
That one’s students are intentional objects of one’s aware-
ness does not make them forward-looking goals of one’s 
intentions. There are other kinds of intentional objects be-
sides intentions. And these may coexist alongside or in the 
background of intentions themselves. 
Now substitute for that packed classroom the extended 
possible world packed with past, present and future counter-
factual agents to whom one’s maxim rationally must apply. 
One’s mindfulness of their presence no more involves a 
forward-looking intentional object in this latter case than in 
the former. Rather, one’s attention and care to the lawlike 
form of one’s maxim, independent of its content or goal, 
expresses that backward-looking intentional attitude whose 
object is an invariant ground of one’s willing; namely, 
“concer[n] […] with the form and principle from which it 
itself follows.” A backward-looking intentional attitude does 
not require, in addition, that one also will conformity to its 
ground or motive as a forward-looking purpose. So willing a 
universalizable maxim expresses respect for the moral law 
without requiring Millgram’s trouble-making CI-maxim. 
Abandoning Millgram’s CI-maxim does not imply that 
we do not care about the moral validity of our actions. But it 
does imply that the moral validity of our actions does not 
require our striving to pass a test of moral validity. Rather, it 
requires our strivings to be in principle lawlike; that is, to 
satisfy the representation thesis. Kant’s claim is that lawlike 
willings confer moral validity on the actions they effect. So 
it appears that Millgram’s sound advice, to attend to Kant’s 
text, has led us to a rather different question than the one he 
himself originally formulated: Why, according to Kant, is a 
universalizable maxim the form and principle of an agent’s 
will? 
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IV. Maxims and the Regulative Principle 
of Pure Reason 
 
he texts of the first Critique and Groundwork answer 
that the agent has no choice; that is the way we are 
cognitively constructed. 22 An agent must will a 
universalizable maxim because of the way maxims fit into 
Kant’s broader account of reason. Kant’s model of reason is 
always one and the same, regardless of context or appli-
cation, namely that which he develops in detail in the 
Dialectic of the first Critique; and he emphasizes this 
repeatedly (cf. KrV, A 815/B 843.28-29; 23 GMS Ak. 
04:391.29-34; KpV, 05:89.15-16 and 05:121.02-06). 
Reason consists in the familiar law-governed operations of 
logical analysis, generalization, deductive and inductive in-
ference, hypothesis formation and application. These enable 
us to organize and unify the data of experience under higher-
order concepts, principles, ideas, and theories through judg-
ment. 
Judgment, for Kant, is the cognitive function by which 
the laws of reason are applied to particular cases, and to the 
special case of action specifically, in order to achieve this 
unity. Judgment collects relevantly similar representations 
already subsumed under a less abstract concept in turn under 
a more abstract one (KrV, A 79.09-19/B 104.26-B 105.12), 
by ascribing a predicate to a subject in a categorical indica-
tive judgment Fx. This is also the form of judgment through 
which we ascribe various predicates to ourselves as subjects. 
In Kant’s Table of Judgments, the categorical indicative 
form of judgment is the first under the rubric of Relation, 
and enters into both hypothetical and disjunctive judgments 
                                                
22 This and the following section recapitulate and elaborate some material 
from “Kant on the Objectivity of the Moral Law,” op. cit. Note 7. More 
recently, see also “Practical Action: First Critique Foundations,” op. cit. Note 
20. 
23 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Herausg. Raymund Schmidt 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976). Henceforth references to this work 
are paginated in the text according to the standard A/B pagination. All 
translations from the German are mine. 
 
T 
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as subsentential or sentential components (KrV, A 70/B 
95.13-27). The logical function of all three forms of judg-
ment is to collect representations under more general and 
abstract ones at every level, and finally all of them under the 
concept “I think” in a single unified consciousness (KrV, B 
143.08-16). Kant directs us to sort and organize the varie-
gated, manifold contents of our minds – "sensation, con-
sciousness, memory, wit, power of discrimination, incli-
nation [Lust], desire, etc." – in such a way that we can apply 
the "logical maxim through which we reduce, so far as poss-
ible, this seeming diversity, so that through comparison one 
might discover hidden identity (KrV, A 649/B 677.01-
09)."24 In so doing, judgment functions to increase theo-
retical coherence, therefore cognitive unity, and thereby the 
unity of the self under this maxim. 
Kant also tells us in the first Critique what a maxim is:  
 
(10) [I]t is simply a subjective law for inventorying 
the supplies of our understanding, through 
comparison of its concepts, in order to bring 
their general use to the smallest possible 
number (KrV, A 306.04-08/B 362.21-25).25 
 
                                                
24 […] wie in dem menschlichen Gemüte die Empfindung, Bewußtsein, 
Einbildung, Erinnerung, Witz, Unterscheidungskraft, Lust, Begierde usw. 
Anfänglich gebietet eine logische Maxime, diese anscheinende 
Verschiedenheit soviel als möglich dadurch zu verringern, daß man durch 
Vergleichung die versteckte Identität entdecke, […] (KrV, A 649/B 677.01-
09). 
25 […] sondern ist bloß ein subjektives Gesetz der Haushaltung mit dem 
Vorrate unseres Verstandes, durch Vergleichung seiner Begriffe, den 
allgemeinen Gebrauch derselben zu bringen […] (KrV, A 306.04-08/B 
362.21-25). 
Patricia Kitcher’s “What is a Maxim?” Philosophical Topics 31, 1 & 2 
(April 2005) provides a careful, scholarly and very thorough survey of the 
literature on this topic that is confined to Kant’s claims about maxims of 
action, and does not address the first Critique background of those claims. I 
think this may partly explain why, on her analysis, only maxims of self-love, 
and not those with moral content, are to be tested by the CI-procedure. I 
don’t see how this can be right, because it is the test itself that determines the 
moral status of a maxim’s content – required, permitted, or prohibited – in 
the first place. But then, as is clear from the discussion, my animadversions 
against the CI-procedure go even deeper than this.  
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A maxim is a principle of judgment that guides the subject in 
collecting, sorting and organizing the experiential and con-
ceptual contents of lower-order judgments. The concept of a 
maxim, for Kant, derives from that of a maximum as the 
rational idea of what is "greatest and absolutely complete ... 
in the division and unification of the knowledge of the 
understanding under one principle" (KrV, A 665/B 693.09-
11)26. The rational idea of a maximum is, in effect, the idea 
of a Theory of Everything. On Kant’s view, it is complete 
and comprehensive knowledge itself that reason is driven to 
maximize, rather than any particular desire-satisfaction that 
might be gained by putting it to use. A maxim approximates 
the maximum to the extent to which the maxim reduces the 
number, while increasing the scope, of the organizing 
principles by which knowledge is managed.  
In addition, Kant tells us what a maxim of reason is: 
 
(11) I call all subjective principles that are derived 
not from the constitution of the object, but 
rather from reason’s interest in considering a 
certain possible perfection of the knowledge 
of this object, maxims of reason (KrV, A 
666/B 694.05-09).27 
 
Whereas a maxim in general is a kind of judgment that 
simply collects the contents of experience under the smallest 
possible number of concepts that organize them, a maxim of 
reason is a judgment that does this with the specific purpose 
of completing our knowledge of the object thus organized – 
that is, with the rational idea in mind of a maximum as the 
valued end-state. A maxim of reason is a certain kind of 
maxim: it does not merely simplify and streamline our con-
                                                
26 […] das Größeste und absolut Vollständige […] der Vereinigung der 
Verstandeserkenntnis in einem Prinzip […]  (KrV, A 665/B 693.09-11). 
27 Ich nenne all subjektiven Grundsätze, die nicht von der Beschaffenheit des 
Objekts, sondern dem Interesse der Vernunft, in Ansehung einer gewissen 
möglichen Vollkommenheit der Erkenntnis dieses Objekts, hergenommen 
sind, Maximen der Vernunft (KrV, A 666/B 694.05-09). 
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ceptual scheme, but also, thereby, aims to maximally en-
hance its scope and depth. Whereas a maxim in general 
could be little more than a shallow and dismissive general-
ization about experience, such as “It’s a jungle out there,” or 
“Got to look out for Number One,” and the like, a maxim of 
reason strives for the status of explanatory first principle in a 
sophisticated, fully unified theory of experience. Whereas a 
maxim in general need not be guided by the rational idea of 
a maximum, a maxim of reason must be.  
Kant’s most important maxim of reason is his Regulative 
Principle of Pure Reason:  
 
(12) . . . to find, for the conditioned knowledge of 
the understanding, the unconditioned whereby 
its unity is completed. 
But this logical maxim can only be a 
principle of pure reason through our assuming 
that if the conditioned is given, so is the entire 
series of conditions, subordinated to one 
another and itself unconditioned, also given 
(KrV, A 307.22-28, A 308.01/B 364.14-21).28 
 
The Regulative Principle of Pure Reason is a maxim of 
reason that guides our search, given any particular, for that 
most abstract, universal and all-inclusive first principle, 
which we also take to be given, from which the particular 
can be deduced (KrV, A 652/B 680.04-12).29 An action, for 
                                                
28 […] der eigentümliche Grundsatz der Vernunft überhaupt (im logischen 
Gebrauche) sei: zu dem bedingten Erkenntnisse des Verstandes das 
Unbedingte zu finden, womit die Einheit desselben vollendet wird. 
Diese logische Maxim kann aber nicht anders ein Prinzipium der reinen 
Vernunft werden, als dadurch, daß man annimmt: wenn das Bedingte 
gegeben ist, so sei auch die ganze Reihe einander untergeordneter 
Bedingungen, die mithin selbst unbedingt ist, gegeben [...] (KrV, A 307.22-
28, A 308.01/B 364.14-21). 
29 [T]hat a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical concepts so far 
as they can be derived from higher and universal ones must be sought is 
elementary, a logical principle, without which no employment of reason 
would occur, since we can conclude from the universal to the particular only 
so far as universal properties of the thing are presupposed, under which the 
particulars stand (KrV, A 652/B 680.04-12).  
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example, is an empirical concrete particular event; and the 
maxim of that action aspires to the status of a maxim of rea-
son that attempts to unify all of the data of our experience, 
all of our conscious knowledge and information at a certain 
time, under a highest-order principle that maximally organ-
izes it according to the lawlike concept of the action we re-
solve to take at that time. In formulating my maxim, I “pull 
it all together,” and I act!  
We can see Kant’s Regulative Principle of Pure Reason 
at work as a guide to inquiry when we perform an action 
whose maxim fails to achieve the status of a maxim of 
reason, and instead strikes us as opaque, arbitrary, or self-
defeating: Our instinctive interrogation of our own motives 
for having performed it seeks an explanatory first principle 
that will render it maximally intelligible to ourselves. This 
search for transparency does not always succeed, for not all 
maxims of action are, in fact, maxims of reason. But Kant 
assumes that if an event really is an action rather than mere 
behavior, its ultimate explanatory first principle is always the 
same, namely one’s freedom to determine one’s own actions 
in light of reason’s demands at that time and place – whether 
this is clear to us or not. These particularizing demands 
specify the range of intermediate universal principles under 
which the action can, in fact, be subsumed. By contrast to a 
mere maxim, a maxim of reason consciously and deliber-
ately determines our behavior in direct and transparent 
response to those demands. Thus Kant’s point is that 
rational action already is maximally intelligible to us, in 
advance of performing it. It is rendered transparent by the 
maxim of reason that governs it and the higher-order uni-
versal principles that subsume it. And it is motivated by 
                                                                                                     
In the German original: […] daß also eine gewisse systematische Einheit 
aller möglichen empirischen Begriffe, sofern sie von höheren und 
allgemeineren abgeleitet werden können, gesucht werden müsse; ist ein 
Schulregel oder logisches Prinzip, ohne welches kein Gebrauch der Vernunft 
stattfände, wie wir nur sofern vom Allgemeinen aufs Besondere schließen 
können, als allgemeine Eigenschaften der Dinge zu Grunde gelegt werden, 
unter denen die besonderen stehen (KrV, A 652/B 680.04-12). 
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respectful attention to its link as a particular with that uni-
versal first principle that is its ultimate ground, irrespective 
of its end, goal or purpose. In this case, the Regulative 
Principle of Pure Reason is functioning, not as a guide to 
inquiry, but rather as a guide to action.  
Thus Kant’s manner-of-willing formulations of the 
categorical “imperative” in the Groundwork are merely an 
application of the first Critique’s Regulative Principle of 
Pure Reason to the special case of action: We are to will 
only that action for which we can find the universal first 
principle from which its maxim can be deduced. That is, we 
are to will a universalizable maxim: 
 
 
 
  Unconditioned First Principle: Freedom [noumenal, intelligible, atemporal] 
 
 
              Universal 
               Principle:           UP1          UP2          UP3          UP4          UP5           UP6          UP7                 … 
 
 
Scope 
                             Maxim:            M1           M2          M3           M4           M5           M6           M7      … 
      Intention:          I1              I2             I3              I4              I5              I6              I7      … 
 
 
           Particular Action:      A1           A2            A3           A4            A5            A6           A7 … 
 
 
    Time 
 
In this diagram, the vertex of each triangle identifies a 
particular action in a chronological series of such actions. 
Each vertex fans out in scope to encompass the intention 
under which the particular action can be subsumed, the 
maxim under which the intention can be subsumed, and 
finally to the most universal principle under which the max-
im can be subsumed at its inverted base. But each such 
universalizable principle itself can be subsumed under the 
unconditioned first principle of freedom. This encompasses 
an agent’s entire chronological series of actions and so has 
the broadest scope and widest base of all. An action from 
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whose universal first principle its maxim can be deduced is 
one that ultimately instantiates the principle of freedom. 
For any particular action within this series, its univers-
alizable maxim is a first-person categorical indicative judg-
ment, ascribing the action as a causal property to oneself as 
agent, of the form, “I will do A.” This judgment collects, 
sorts, orders and ranks all of the cognitive and conative data 
that constitute one’s consciousness of oneself, one’s mo-
tives, one’s purposes and one’s circumstances at a particular 
time and place. As a maxim of reason, it thereby unifies the 
contents of self-knowledge, enabling one to collect oneself, 
in preparation for action. To describe it as universalizable is 
to ascribe to it the implicit force of law – not as a pre-
scription but rather as a principle of organization by which 
these contents are recognized. When Kant later in the first 
Critique describes maxims as “practical laws, in so far as 
they become at the same time subjective grounds of actions, 
i.e. subjective principles (KrV A 812/B 840.18-20),”30 he is 
calling attention to the conative power of such a judgment to 
spur action by organizing the various contents of one’s pre-
sent experience under it. Through the regulative act of judg-
ment itself, then, reason becomes motivationally effective: 
 
(13) [Reason’s laws] admittedly still require a 
power of judgment sharpened by experience, 
in part to distinguish to which cases they 
apply, in part to procure for them entry to the 
human will and impact [Nachdruck] on 
practice (GMS Ak. 04:389.35-39; cf. first 
Critique, KrV, B 150.16-19, B 153.19-24, B 
154.01-02).31 
                                                
30 Praktische Gesetze, sofern sie zugleich subjektive Gründe der 
Handlungen, d.i. subjective Grundsätze werden, heißen Maximen (KrV A 
812/B 840.18-20). 
31 […] Gesetze a priori, die freilich noch durch Erfahrung geschärfte 
Urteilskraft erfordern, um teils zu unterscheiden, in welchen Fällen sie ihre 
Anwendung haben, teils ihnen Eingang in den Willen des Menschen und 
Nachdruck zur Ausübung zu verschaffen, [...] (GMS Ak. 04:389.35-39) 
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These laws require application in the universalizable max-
ims that instantiate them. The judgment that applies to my 
own cognitive and conative state a lawlike descriptive max-
im that subsumes and organizes its manifold mental cont-
ents thereby causally effects the action it ascribes to me.  
So in order for a maxim of action to be rational – i.e. to 
enter into any process of rational deliberation, whether 
actual, subliminal, or rationally reconstructed, it must be 
lawlike in exactly the same two ways that any such 
cognitive judgment is lawlike. First, it must subsume lower-
order particulars under it as instances – specifically, in this 
case, the particulars of the action I intend to perform. 
Second, it itself must be subsumable under such a higher-
order judgment. The principle of universality that Kant 
describes as a “standard [Richtmaße] of judgment” (GMS 
Ak. 04:404.01) is the standard that any rational judgment 
with any content whatsoever must meet. “The concept of 
[my] action in itself already contains a law for me” in both 
of these ways. To answer Millgram’s reframed question, 
then, a universalizable maxim is the form and principle of an 
agent’s will because its universalizable form is what makes 
it rational.  
This brief and very incomplete textual summary of what 
a maxim is may begin to shed light on why Kant says at 
GMS Ak. 04:432.35-36 that the human will is a universal 
law-making will – not that it should be, or could be under 
ideal conditions, but that it is, in so far as it is rational. If a 
maxim of action is, as he has said, simply the formal prin-
ciple of a certain kind of lawlike judgment that expresses our 
intention to act, then it is not difficult to see why he thinks 
this. For unless a judgment contains proper names or rigged 
definite descriptions, it is, in fact, universal in its scope of 
denotation.32 Kant argues that the human will makes 
                                                
32 Thus I agree with O’Neill, against Hare, that universality can be predi-
cated of the content of some judgments, but not of acts of judgment (see Nell, 
op. cit. Note 4, 17). However, I would add to O’Neill that universality can be 
predicated of the form of some judgments and not only of their content. 
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universal law through its maxims because maxims are judg-
ments, and other things equal, this is the way nonindexical 
judgments ordinarily work.  
This holds for judgments expressing the intention to act 
no less than for any other kind. All of the textbook counter-
examples to the CI-procedure Millgram considers fail it:33 
 
(14) I will buy clockwork trains but not sell them 
(548).34 
 
(15) I will always be first through the door (548). 
 
(16) I will turn up at Times Square tomorrow 
(548). 
                                                                                                     
Rawls distinguishes between the generality of a principle – that it should 
contain no proper names or rigged definite descriptions, and its universality – 
that it should apply to “everyone in virtue of their being moral persons,” 
rather than merely to a restricted subset of such individuals (A Theory of 
Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1971), 131-132). I conflate 
this distinction, first, because Kant often does – he frequently uses allgemein 
and universal interchangeably; second, because if a principle is universal in 
Rawls’s sense then a fortiori it is general; third, because Rawls’s rendering of 
a universal principle fails to distinguish between its denotation and its 
application; and fourth, because “moral persons” denotes precisely the kind 
of restricted subset of individuals his account of universality is supposed to 
exclude, thereby begging all of the interesting questions; see my Rationality 
and the Structure of the Self, Volume 1: The Humean Conception (Berlin: 
http://adrianpiper.com/rss/docs/Rationality%20Vol%20the%20Structure%20
of%20the%20Self%20Volume%20I-
%20The%20Humean%20Conception.pdf. APRA Foundation Berlin, 2008), 
Chapter X. “Rawl’s Instrumentalism” for a fuller treatment. Any judgment 
restricts its scope of application to that subset of individuals picked out by its 
referring terms. I call a judgment or principle universal in its denotation if, in 
virtue of containing no proper names or rigged definite descriptions, it refers 
indifferently to all such individuals. 
33 I offer some additional mischief-making maxims that the CI-procedure 
cannot so easily dispose of in Rationality and the Structure of the Self, 
Volume II: A Kantian Conception (Berlin: 
http://adrianpiper.com/rss/docs/Rationality%20and%20the%20Structure%20
of%20the%20Self,%20Volume%20II-
%20A%20Kantian%20Conception.pdf, APRA Foundation Berlin, 2008), 
Chapter V. “How Reason Causes Action.” 
34 Nell, op. cit. Note 4, 76. 
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Millgram rightly deplores the New Kantian tendency to 
dispose of all such counterexamples by declassifying them, 
waiving the CI-procedure, or “setting them aside” (547 and 
fn. 44). This is to make the tail wag the dog, and draws the 
wrong conclusion from these “puzzle cases.” The correct 
conclusion is not that such puzzle cases are to be ignored or 
dismissed; but rather that they demonstrate something 
different from what New Kantians claim for the CI-pro-
cedure. What they show is that not all maxims of action are 
maxims of reason. Instead, some are arbitrary, idiosyncratic, 
or otherwise opaque to explanatory first principles in pre-
cisely the manner of (14), (15) or (16). Among those, only a 
subset corresponds to our intuitive notions of unethical 
behavior. The inscrutability of evil is merely a special case 
of the explanatory opacity of incompletely rational maxims 
of action more generally; and an expanded Davidsonian 
principle of charity (i.e. that failures of rationality imply that 
the agent is either stupid, crazy or evil) would counsel 
special treatment for all of them. 
 
 
V. Kant’s Maxim Rationality Test 
 
o far I have argued that Kant’s twenty-four manner-
of-willing formulations of the categorical imperative 
in the Groundwork are the result of applying the first 
Critique’s Regulative Principle of Pure Reason to the special 
case of action: we are to will only that action for which we 
can find the universal first principle from which its maxim 
can be deduced. But how are we to ascertain which maxims 
bear this logical relationship to the universal first principles 
that govern them? In the first Critique, Kant also describes 
the general procedure by which we in fact identify such a 
universalizable maxim. This he calls the Hypothetical – 
actually the hypothesis-forming – Employment of Reason: 
 
(17) If reason is a faculty of deducing the 
S 
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particular from the universal, then either the 
universal is already certain in itself and given, 
and so requires only judgment for 
subsumption, and the particular is thereby 
necessarily determined; … or else the 
universal is given only problematically, and is 
a mere idea. Here the particular is certain, but 
the universality of the rule from which it 
follows is still a problem.  Then more 
particular instances, each of which are certain, 
try on the rule for size to see whether they 
follow from it. In this case, if it appears that all 
particular instances assigned do follow from it, 
then we conclude to the universality of the 
rule, and thence to all instances, even those not 
themselves given (KrV, A 646/B 674.18-29, 
A 647/B 675.01-05).35 
  
Passage (17) describes how we fix the relationship between 
particular and universal that enter into rational deduction and 
induction. “Particulars” may be either concrete particulars or 
lower-order concepts. The latter in turn include particular 
principles. All are possible candidates for subsumption 
under a universal, or for derivation from it. Here Kant is 
offering not only a description of how reason works, but also 
a method for testing the nomological scope of a rule relative 
to such candidates.  
                                                
35 Wenn die Vernunft ein Vermögen ist, das Besondere aus dem 
Allgemeinen abzuleiten, so ist entweder das Allgemeine schon an sich gewiß 
und gegeben, und alsdann erfordert es nur Urteilskraft zur Subsumtion, und 
das Besondere wird dadurch notwendig bestimmt. […] Oder das Allgemeine 
wird nur problematisch angenommen, und ist eine bloße Idee, das Besondere 
ist gewiß, aber die Allgemeinheit der Regel zu dieser Folge ist noch ein 
Problem; so werden mehrere besondere Fälle, die insgesamt gewiß sind, an 
der Regel versucht, ob sie daraus fließen, und in diesem Falle, wenn es den 
Anschein hat, daß all anzugebenden besonderen Fälle daraus abfolgen, wird 
auf die Allgemeinheit der Regel, aus dieser aber nachher auf all Fälle, die 
auch an sich nicht gegeben sind, geschlossen (KrV, A 646/B 674.18-29, A 
647/B 675.01-05). 
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There are two alternatives. In the first, the universality of 
the rule is certain and given by definition or analysis. In this 
case, judgment need only deduce the particular from it. In 
the second, the universal rule is merely stipulated hypo-
thetically, whereas it is the particular that is certain and 
given. This latter case is the one in which we are reasoning 
about empirical conditions, or trying to explain empirical 
events and states of affairs. In this case, the method deter-
mines the scope of empirical application of the rule, by 
assessing its ability to subsume other, equally certain partic-
ulars as instances. If these can, indeed, be derived from the 
rule, we conclude to its universality and nomological ne-
cessity. In this case, the relation between particular and rule 
satisfies Kant’s Regulative Principle of Pure Reason. 
The procedure described by Kant’s Hypothetical Em-
ployment of Reason ascertains the rational status of any 
concrete empirical particular, event, or state of affairs, as 
well as of any lower-order empirical concept or principle 
that might be invoked to describe it. By implication, there-
fore, it also ascertains the rational status of particular 
maxims of action. That is, the Hypothetical Employment of 
Pure Reason in general implies a Maxim Rationality Test 
for actions in particular: 
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(18) The Maxim Rationality Test 
 
(1) We begin with two elements: 
 (1.1) A particular, given intention to act; this is what 
Kant calls an instance. 
 (1.2) A particular maxim that expresses that intention 
sententially, a provisionally universal categorical 
indicative judgment ascribing the action as a 
causal property to the agent; this is what Kant 
calls a rule. 
(2) Next we consider whether the maxim is or is not in fact 
universalizable, in answer to the following questions: 
 (2.1) Does the particular intention accurately 
instantiate it? 
  (2.1.1) If not, either the intention or the 
maxim must be revised. 
  (2.1.2) If so, we conclude that the maxim 
veridically conceptualizes the 
agent’s actual intention and 
therefore functions as a genuine 
lower-order rule that governs and 
subsumes that intention. 
 (2.2) Does the maxim itself in turn instantiate a 
higher-order rule that applies to other agents 
who intend the same action? 
  (2.2.1) If not, we conclude to the maxim’s 
violation of the universalizability 
requirement, and therefore that it fails 
the Regulative Principle of Pure 
Reason. 
  (2.2.2) If so, we conclude that the maxim is, 
indeed, universalizable, and 
therefore satisfies the Regulative 
Principle of Pure Reason. 
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The Maxim Rationality Test derives from Kant’s Hypo-
thetical Employment of Reason in general a specific method 
for determining whether a maxim of action satisfies Kant’s 
Regulative Principle of Pure Reason, and is therefore a 
maxim of reason. It departs from one particular ambiguity in 
Kant’s text, by making a significant terminological substi-
tution. Whereas passage (17) speaks of whether or not par-
ticular instances follow from the rule being tested, the 
Maxim Rationality Test instead speaks only of whether or 
not intentions or maxims instantiate the rule being tested. It 
excludes that reading of Kant’s text that would require a 
deductive or materially implicative relationship between 
instance and rule, because no empirical rule logically or 
even materially implies all of its instances. The Maxim 
Rationality Test thereby avoids committing Kant to a form 
of Deductivism that is, as is argued in Section VII below, 
much too strong. Instead it offers a weaker and more plaus-
ible application of the reasoning procedure Kant describes at 
passage (17) that avoids this commitment.36  
The Maxim Rationality Test tells us how to meet the re-
quirements on action of Kant’s Regulative Principle of Pure 
Reason. In order to ascertain what actions to will, we must 
first ascertain what maxims of action instantiate higher-order 
universal principles and finally the first principle of freedom; 
                                                
36 This procedure, and passage (17) more generally, bear a more than passing 
resemblance to Rawls’s Reflective Equilibrium procedure, a method for 
achieving consistency between one’s moral intuitions about particular cases 
and the overarching moral theory that is supposed to explain them. In both 
cases, one is required to both formulate the general rule in light of the 
particular instance, and also be prepared to jettison the particular instance 
should it fail subsumption under a plausibly formulated general rule. In both 
cases, a mismatch between them forces a choice about which to modify or 
abandon. And in both cases, the intended outcome is the same: that 
transparent deliberative link between the particular case in question and the 
universal first principle that is its ultimate explanatory ground. Up through 
his supervision of Susan Neiman’s 1986 dissertation (later published as The 
Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994) Rawls was very familiar with the Dialectic of the first Critique, so it is 
unlikely that this resemblance is accidental. See Rawls, op. cit. Footnote 32, 
especially his introductory description of the process of reaching reflective 
equilibrium at page 20.  
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i.e. what maxims of action are also maxims of reason. In 
order to ascertain that, we must first ascertain the logical 
relationship between the particular maxims our intentions 
instantiate, and the more general higher-order rules we take 
those maxims to instantiate in turn. That is, correct reasoning 
about action veridically subsumes intentions under maxims, 
and maxims in turn under higher-order universal principles, 
or maxims of reason. The maxim universalizability criterion 
Kant introduces in the manner-of-willing formulations of the 
categorical imperative in the Groundwork is in fact a highly 
condensed recapitulation of the much more detailed and 
complex account of reasoning about action that he offers in 
the Dialectic of the first Critique. 
 
 
VI. Exceptions 
 
aving ventured an answer to Millgram’s modified 
question as to why a universalizable maxim is the 
form and principle of an agent’s will, we are now 
in a better position to address his argument that successful 
agency requires making exceptions to such maxims as a 
matter of principle. Let us again take his advice, by looking 
in depth at what Kant actually says in the Groundwork about 
maxims that fail the Maxim Rationality Test (18) at step 
(2.2.1) above: 
 
(19) (a) If we now attend to ourselves whenever 
we transgress a duty, (b) we find that we do 
not really will such that our maxim should 
become a universal law, (c) because that is 
impossible for us; (d) but rather the opposite 
is itself in reality to remain universally a law. 
(e) We only take the liberty of making an 
exception to it for ourselves (or only just for 
this once) to the advantage of our inclination. 
(f) Consequently, if we were to consider 
everything from one from one and the same 
H 
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standpoint, namely reason, (g) we would   
come across a contradiction in our own will, 
(h) namely that a particular principle should be 
objectively necessary as universal law, (i) and 
yet subjectively not be universally valid, but 
rather should allow exceptions. (j) But as we 
first consider our action from the standpoint of 
a will wholly in accord with reason, (k) but 
then exactly the same action from the 
standpoint of a will affected by inclination, (l) 
actually there is no contradiction here, (m) but 
rather an opposition of inclination to the 
prescription of reason (antagonismus), (n) 
through which the universality of the principle 
(universalitas) is turned into a mere generality 
(generalitas), (o) in such a way that the 
practical principle of reason is supposed to 
join up halfway with the maxim (GMS Ak. 
04:424.18-39).37 
 
Passage (19) applies the Maxim Rationality Test from the 
Dialectic of the first Critique to Kant’s analysis of what goes 
                                                
37 (19) (a) Wenn wir nun auf uns selbst bei jeder Übertretung einer Pflicht 
Acht haben, (b) so finden wir, daß wir wirklich nicht wollen, es solle unsere 
Maxime ein allgemeines Gesetz werden, (c) denn das ist uns unmöglich, (d) 
sondern das Gegenteil derselben soll vielmehr allgemein ein Gesetz bleiben; 
(e) nur nehmen wir uns die Freiheit, für uns (oder auch nur für diesesmal) 
zum Vorteil unserer Neigung davon eine Ausnahme zu machen. (f) Folglich, 
wenn wir alles aus einem und demselben Gesichtspunkte, nämlich der 
Vernunft, erwögen, (g) so würden wir einen Widerspruch in unserem eigenen 
Willen antreffen, (h) nämlich daß ein gewisses Prinzip objektiv als 
allgemeines Gesetz notwendig sei (i) und doch subjektive nicht allgemein 
gelten, sondern Ausnahmen verstatten sollte. (j) Da wir aber einmal unsere 
Handlung aus dem Gesichtspunkte eines ganz der Vernunft gemäßen, (k) 
dann aber auch ebendieselbe Handlung aus dem Gesichtspunkte eines durch 
Neigung affizierten Willens betrachten, (l) so ist wirklich hier kein 
Widerspruch, (m) wohl aber ein Widerstand der Neigung gegen die 
Vorschrift der Vernunft (antagonismus), (n) wodurch die Allgemeinheit des 
Prinzips (universalitas) in eine bloße Gemeingültigkeit (generalitas) 
verwandelt wird, (o) dadurch das praktische Vernunftprinzip mit der Maxime 
auf dem halben Wege zusammenkommen soll (GMS Ak. 04:424.18-39). 
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wrong with a morally derelict maxim. Step (1) presents us 
with the two elements: (1.1) a particular, derelict intention to 
act as the instance in clause (a); and (1.2) its maxim as the 
rule in clause (b). In step (2), we try to fix the scope of the 
maxim – in (2.1.2), by acknowledging our derelict intention 
as instantiating the maxim we formulate to express it; and in 
(2. 2), by trying to extend that maxim as a rule that applies to 
other, similarly situated agents by provisionally ascribing the 
intended action to them. In Step (2.2.1), “we find that we do 
not really will such that our maxim should become a uni-
versal law” [clause (b)], because we see that “this is im-
possible for us” [clause (c)]. That is, our derelict intention 
itself causes a loss of respectful attention to securing the 
lawlike form of its maxim (2.2), and thereby causes us to 
lose the will to formulate the maxim representing our inten-
tion (2.1.1) at all. Instead, we resituate the derelict intention 
(1.1) as an exception to a pre-existing universal principle 
that it violates [clauses (d)-(e)], “to the advantage of our 
inclination.” That derelict intention now stands alone as a 
causally efficacious inclinational event; a concrete particular 
instance without a rule or principle, i.e. without a maxim that 
subsumes it. Kant is here describing the morally fraught case 
in which we act deliberately and intentionally, but also 
deliberately relinquish the attempt to conceptualize to our-
selves what it is exactly that we are doing. By temporarily 
disconnecting the operations of reason from their application 
to our own behavior, we circumvent its motivational power 
to direct or inhibit that behavior.  
Now, from the unified perspective of reason, we both will 
the continuing universality of the pre-existing principle 
[clause (h)], and also will that it should not be universal but 
rather accommodate the derelict intention (1.1) as an 
exception [clause (i)]. When we will in the first case, we are 
approaching action from the standpoint of a rational, lawlike 
will [clause (j)]; when we will in the second case, we are 
approaching action from the standpoint of “a will affected 
by inclination” [clause (k)]. In both cases, the backward-
looking intentional object of our willings is the contested 
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scope of the pre-existing principle, not the maximless dere-
lict intention that conflicts with it. It is the muting gravi-
tational pull on the will of that unconceptualized intention 
that creates the “will affected by inclination,” i.e. a weak-
ened willing and failure of resolve that progressively dimin-
ishes the scope of one’s willing to the concrete particular 
present moment of the inclinational event. Conjointly, then, 
these two contradictory willings reduce the universal scope 
of the pre-existing principle to “a mere generality” [clause 
(n)], with which the derelict intention (1.1) is consistent as 
an exception.  
In accordance with the argument of Section III above, 
these two contradictory willings do not constitute a contra-
diction embedded within a forward-looking intentional ob-
ject, in which I will both the universality of a maxim and 
simultaneously an exception to it. This would be to will a 
self-contradictory object, and can be represented symbol-
ically using a notation that integrates the language of 
preference used by Ramsey-Savage decision theory into the 
classical predicate logic on which Kant relied. 38 Reading 
Pw as “w wills [or strictly prefers] …” (i.e. as a predicate 
rather than an operator), we represent the case in which I 
will a self-contradictory object that includes both the uni-
versal maxim and the exception to it as  
 
(20)  Pw[(∃a)(x)Fx . ~Fa].  
 
Here the contradiction is not in my will per se, as Kant’s text 
requires, but rather in the object of my will. Nor, similarly, 
do these two contradictory willings constitute a contra-
diction between two contradictory intentional objects; for 
                                                
38 I develop this quantification-based notation for the logic of preference in 
depth in Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian 
Conception (Berlin: 
http://adrianpiper.com/rss/docs/Rationality%20and%20the%20Structure%20
of%20the%20Self,%20Volume%20II-
%20A%20Kantian%20Conception.pdf, APRA Foundation Berlin, 2008), 
Chapter III. “The Concept of a Genuine Preference.” 
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(21) Pw[(x)Fx] . Pw[~Fa]  
 
is not a contradiction at all. Passage (19) contains no 
suggestion that the “contradiction in the will” described in 
clause (g) depends on any particular forward-looking inten-
tional object of the will – much less on any such pair of 
objects that contradict or conflict with each other. It thus 
does not invite an interpretation of Kant’s discussions of 
cultivating one’s talents or helping others that elaborates 
those analyses in terms of wanting both x and not-x, or both 
x and y when these are conceived as being in conflict, or in 
terms of what we would want or not want, were certain 
counterfactual conditions to apply. When Kant says about 
the man contemplating whether or not to neglect the 
cultivation of his natural gifts, 
 
(22) He sees here, that a system of nature could 
always indeed exist under such a universal 
law …; only he cannot possibly will that this 
become a universal law of nature … (GMS 
Ak. 04:423.09-16),39 
 
or about the man deliberating about whether or not to help 
others in need, 
 
(23) But although it is possible that a universal 
law of nature could exist according to this 
maxim, it is nevertheless impossible to will 
that such a principle should hold everywhere 
as a law of nature (GMS Ak. 04:423.33-37),40 
 
                                                
39 Da sieht er nun, daß zwar eine Natur nach einem solchen allgemeinen 
Gesetze immer noch bestehen könne, ...; allein er kann unmöglich wollen, 
daß dieses ein allgemeines Naturgesetz werde ... (GMS Ak. 04:423.09-16). 
40 Aber obgleich es möglich ist, daß nach jener Maxime ein allgemeines 
Naturgesetz wohl bestehen könnte, so ist doch unmöglich, zu wollen, daß ein 
solches Prinzip als Naturgesetz allenthalben gelte (GMS Ak. 04:423.33-37). 
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his argument is exactly the same in both cases. Someone 
with a derelict intention seeks to justify it by willing an ac-
tion he tries unsuccessfully to represent as a law that neither 
he nor anyone else is to cultivate their talents or help others. 
He also “does not really will” this, because he knows he can 
indulge his own passive neglect only if others do not indulge 
theirs. Such a will would, indeed, “be in conflict with itself, 
since many cases can arise in which he needs [the advantage 
of others’ efforts] ….” (GMS Ak. 04:423.37-38).41 So he 
intends, rather, that “the opposite [of his derelict intention] is 
itself in reality to remain universally a law” [clause (d) of 
passage (19)], so as to continue to enjoy the advantages of 
others’ efforts. At the same time that his derelict intention 
subverts his respectful attention to the lawlike form of his 
maxim, the lawlike form of his reason more generally 
subverts his success in ignoring it. 
Thus clauses (f) – (i) of passage (19) call our attention to a 
straightforward logical contradiction of the old-fashioned 
kind, between two incompatible backward-looking inten-
tional attitudes, in which I both do and “do not really will” 
[clause (b)] a universalizable maxim, such that  
 
(24) Pw[(x)Fx] . ~Pw[(x)Fx].  
 
As Kant says, there is no inconsistency involved in willing 
as a universal law the practice of neglecting one’s talents or 
refusing to render aid, and the corresponding derelict 
intention motivates one to do so. Yet it also discourages one 
from doing so at the same time, on pain of thwarting one’s 
advantage in enacting it. What is “impossible for us” is not 
willing an exception to a universal law; but rather to “really 
will” the exception as itself a universal law.  
                                                
41 (a) Denn ein Wille, der dieses beschlösse, (b) würde sich selbst 
widerstreiten, (c) indem der Fälle sich doch manche ereignen können, (d) wo 
er anderer Liebe und Teilnehmung bedarf, ... (GMS Ak. 04:423.37-38). 
Notice Kant’s use of the indicative voice in clauses (c) and (d). He clearly 
means here to be describing the empirical reality that explains why such a 
contradiction in the will would be at best a counterfactual conditional 
supposition. 
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This conclusion holds by virtue of Kant’s conception of 
what an exception is. An exception, for Kant, is not simply a 
state of affairs that departs from some particular rule. It is a 
state of affairs that we choose to exempt from any rule, i.e. 
that we decline to universalize at all. Under these circum-
stances, it is just not logically possible to have it both ways: 
to claim both exceptional status for that state of affairs, and 
also its universalizability in its own right. This is a perfectly 
general point that holds independently of the particular 
content of that state of affairs. A fortiori, it holds for states of 
affairs that are derelict intentions, independently of their 
particular content. Whatever that content is, we cannot both 
exempt the derelict intention from the ongoing lawlike 
operations of reason on the one hand, and ascribe to it a 
lawlike rational status on the other. Therefore, it really is not 
possible for us to both enact our unconceptualized derelict 
intention, and also to conceptualize or represent it as one that 
everyone might have at this moment. That would be to fore-
go all the collective advantages of reason and system that 
enable us to indulge it. Maxims of action that try to subsume 
derelict intentions fail to achieve the status of a maxim of 
reason because one’s formulation of it fails to “pull it all 
together.” That is, it fails to pull the exception together with 
the other particulars it subsumes. Because this is the case 
independently of the particular content of that derelict inten-
tion, it therefore holds independently of its particular goal. 
Thus the contradiction in the will that Kant describes in 
clause (g) of passage (19) is between two incompatible 
manners of willing, not in the intentional object that we will. 
Now the core of Millgram’s critique of the CI-procedure 
was the New Kantians’ problematic treatment of exceptions. 
Kant’s own treatment of exceptions in passage (19) is rather 
less problematic. Just as he earlier described in the first 
Critique the way reason must function in order for us to 
have unified experience and take unified action, here in the 
Groundwork he similarly describes how we must deal with 
the sorts of exceptions that Millgram’s critique targets. Kant 
does not think we can successfully modify a universal 
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principle by building an exception into it – not even pro-
visionally. Nor does he think we can build in generic, ceteris 
paribus exception clauses into such principles. Nor does he 
ever deny the necessity of our trying to will the universality 
of all of our maxims. Nor, therefore, can derelict maxims be 
excluded from the class of bona fide maxims. Nor does the 
agent have discretion to decide what is and what is not a 
maxim. On Kant’s model of reason, our innate cognitive 
structure is such that all of these ad hoc New Kantian moves 
are foreclosed to us, and Millgram is quite right to reject 
them. Because maxims express intentions to act, and be-
cause we are moved to will universalizable maxims, we 
have only one recourse for dealing with maxims that violate 
this requirement. That is, as clauses (n) – (o) describe, to 
pretend it is not really a requirement at all. This, for Kant, is 
where bad faith – evil, actually – begins.  
 
 
VII. Kant’s Self-Legislation Procedure 
Reconsidered 
 
o far I have tried to show, first, that most of Kant’s 
thirty-eight “universal law” formulations of the cate-
orical “imperative” (all are listed in Appendix Table 
3) can be sorted into two subsets: those which enjoin the 
universalizability of our maxim as a goal or incentive of the 
will, and those which enjoin it as a lawlike manner of 
willing. Second, I have tried to show that this second set of 
formulations, and passage (8) as a particular example, is an 
application of his Regulative Principle of Pure Reason from 
the first Critique to the special case of action. Third, I have 
argued that Kant’s Hypothetical Employment of Reason in 
the first Critique offers a method for determining whether or 
not a particular satisfies the lawlike requirements of the 
Regulative Principle of Pure Reason. Fourth, I have derived 
from Kant’s description of how the Hypothetical Employ-
ment of Reason functions a Maxim Rationality Test for de-
termining whether or not a particular maxim of action satis-
S 
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fies the lawlike requirements of the Regulative Principle of 
Pure Reason.  
However, I have not argued that Kant’s Maxim Ration-
ality Test enables us to derive our moral duties from the 
categorical imperative. I think Kant should not have claimed 
this,42 and that the New Kantians make a mistake in trying 
to defend it. As I have tried to show both here and else-
where, their assumption that a maxim, and indeed an inten-
tion – is a prescriptive judgment in the imperative mood 
about what I ought to do43 does not square well with the 
textual evidence, either in the first Critique or in the 
Groundwork. A maxim is, indeed, a regulative principle that 
guides and directs our reasoning in such a way as to extend 
it past the limits of present empirical experience (KrV, A 
666/B 694.13-22) – most importantly, into future action. But 
that does not make it prescriptive in form. A maxim is a 
descriptive judgment about what my intention actually is, 
not a prescriptive judgment about what I ought to do.  
Correspondingly, the law that universalizes that maxim is 
similarly a descriptive principle in the indicative mood that 
denotes the ideal behavior of a fully rational agent, not an 
imperative that exhorts us to live up to it. The reason why 
                                                
42 And Kant definitely does claim this, at GMS Ak. 04:421.10-12: “Wenn 
nun aus diesem einigen Imperative alle Imperativen der Pflicht, als aus ihrem 
Prinzip, abgeleitet werden können, so werden wir, ob wir es gleich 
unausgemacht lassen, ob nicht überhaupt das, was man Pflicht nennt, ein 
leerer Begriff sei, doch wenigstens anzeigen können, was wir dadurch 
denken und was dieser Begriff sagen wolle.“ At GMS Ak.04:423.43-44, 
424.01-02, the German Academy edition runs, “Dieses sind nun einige von 
den vielen wirklichen oder wenigstens von uns dafür gehaltenen Pflichten, 
deren Abtheilung aus dem einigen angeführten Prinzip klar in die Augen 
fällt.“ Timmerman’s translation is true to this text, whereas I would substitute 
„Ableitung“ [derivation] for „Abtheilung“ [division]. The reason is the 
relation between this passage and the earlier one at GMS Ak. 04:421.10, 
where Kant uses and clearly means to use the verb „abgeleitet.“ If we take his 
pronouncement there at face value, then his use of „Abtheilung“ at GMS Ak. 
04:423.43 may have been a slip of the pen. 
43 Rawls embraces this assumption in his “Themes in Kant’s Moral 
Philosophy,” in Eckart Förster, Ed., Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: The 
Three ‘Critiques’ and the ‘Opus Postumum’ (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1989), 83. O’Neill almost escapes its infelicitous consequences by 
distinguishing between a universalized maxim, which she characterizes in the 
imperative mood, and its universalized typified counterpart (UTC), which 
she frames in the indicative. Op. cit. Note 4, 61-62. 
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the Groundwork contains only four formulations of Kant’s 
basic principle of morality in the strict imperative mood44 is 
because Kant was more interested in analyzing the complex 
relation of imperfectly rational human beings to the regu-
lative, descriptive rational ideal that they naturally generate 
to guide their behavior. So although Millgram is right that 
successful agency under conditions of risk or uncertainty 
requires occasional exceptions to such rules, these con-
ditions do not apply to the circumstances that the categorical 
“imperative” envisions. Rather, these ideally rational cir-
cumstances assume full and public information that enables 
each such agent to easily coordinate her behavior with 
others’. It is only because imperfectly rational human agents 
are compelled by their own cognitive structure to guide their 
actual behavior by principles designed for fully rational ones 
that they reflexively excuse their derelictions by demoting 
those principles to “mere generalities.” 
Now about O’Neill’s contradiction tests Millgram says, 
and most of the New Kantians agree,45 that 
  
(25) [A]lthough I have described the procedure as 
something you pause to execute before going 
ahead with an action you have in mind, the 
Kantian requirement is of course not that you 
stand around muttering to yourself before you 
do anything. The procedure is meant as a 
rational reconstruction of the deliberative 
background to a decision properly arrived at 
…. (527) 
                                                
44 These four are listed in Appendix Table 2.1. Table 2.2 lists the only two 
formulations that uses the Subjunctive I form of the imperative to modify a 
wollen- or handeln-type verb. There are other formulations, listed in Appen-
dix Table 1, that use the Subjunctive I form of the imperative in subsidiary 
positions, otherwise than to exhort the reader to will or act in a certain way. I 
leave their identification as an exercise for the reader. 
45 See John Rawls, “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” op. cit. Note 43, 
82. Also see his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Ed. Barbara 
Herman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 218. O’Neill, how-
ever, does not share this view. See Acting on Principle, op. cit. Note 4, 71-72, 
74.  
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Actually that is exactly not what Kant himself meant. It is 
clear from the language he uses when he is introducing or 
commenting upon the four examples, both in Chapters I and 
II of the Groundwork, that he intends it precisely as “some-
thing you pause to execute before going ahead with an 
action you have in mind.” Thus he says, in introducing the 
false promising case, “In order to instruct myself in the 
quickest and surest way whether a lying promise accords 
with duty …, I ask myself: etc.” (GMS Ak. 04:403.03-06).46 
In his concluding remarks about that case, he says, 
“Inexperienced in considering the ways of the world, unable 
to prepare myself for all the incidents that occur in it, I 
simply ask myself: etc.”(GMS Ak. 04:403.24-26).47 In 
setting up the four examples in Chapter II, he describes the 
potential suicide as a man who “is still so far in possession 
of his reason that he can ask himself, etc.” (GMS Ak. 
04:422.02-03).48 He revisits the false promising example by 
describing the agent as someone who “has a mind to make 
such a [false] promise; but still has sufficient conscience to 
ask himself: etc.” (GMS Ak. 04:422.22-23).49 And he des-
cribes the man of uncultivated talents in the third example as 
someone who “sees himself in comfortable circumstances 
… [y]et asks further, etc.” (GMS Ak. 04: 423.02-03, 05).50 
In all of these cases, Kant clearly means to be describing 
an actual empirical event, i.e. the process of interrogative 
                                                
46 Um indessen mich in Ansehung der Beantwortung dieser Aufgabe, ob ein 
lügenhaftes Versprechen pflichtmäßig sei, auf die allerkürzeste und doch 
untrügliche Art zu belehren, so frage ich mich selbst: usw. (GMS Ak. 
04:403.03-06). 
47 Unerfahren in Ansehung des Weltlaufs, unfähig auf alle sich ereignenden 
Vorfälle desselben gefaßt zu sein, frage ich mich nur: usw. (GMS Ak. 
04:403.24-26). 
48 Einer ... ist noch soweit im Besitze seiner Vernunft, daß er sich selbst 
fragen kann, usw. (GMS Ak. 04:422.02-03).  
49 Er hat Lust, ein solches Versprechen zu tun; aber noch hat er so viel 
Gewissen, sich zu fragen: usw. (GMS Ak. 04:422.22-23). 
50 Er sieht sich aber in bequemen Umständen [...]. Noch fragt er aber, usw. 
(GMS Ak. 04:423.02-03, 05). 
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reasoning one undertakes in order to reach a concrete de-
cision about whether or not to embark on some specific, 
envisaged course of action. That process is captured by his 
description of the Hypothetical Employment of Reason dis-
cussed above. It is clearly a method we are supposed to 
actually employ when reasoning, and we do. The contra-
diction in the will test is Kant’s philosophical elaboration of 
the common and very commonsensical counterfactual ques-
tion, “How would you like it if someone did that to you?” 
And the contradiction in conception test is Kant’s philo-
sophical elaboration of the equally common and common-
sensical counterfactual question, “What if everybody did 
that?” We do, in fact, ask ourselves these very questions 
when debating a course of action, whether in solitude or in 
society. O’Neill’s two contradiction tests reconstruct and 
refine what Kant takes to be the fundamental mode of moral 
reasoning actual human agents undertake when they “stand 
around muttering to [themselves] before [they] do any-
thing.” And Kant believes that answering these questions is 
sufficient to conclude it. All of Kant’s examples describe an 
agent who is viscerally attempting to answer them; and for 
whom, consequently, this attempt is the object of a forward-
looking, goal-directed intentional attitude of inquiry.  
Kant thought to answer them by applying to actual, 
forward-looking, goal-directed deliberation the very same 
backward-looking formal requirement by which he had pre-
viously defined the capacity to reason in general, namely 
that our thoughts be organized in a lawlike manner. If, as he 
earlier argued (KrV, A 652/B 680.04-12), his Regulative 
Principle of Pure Reason leads us to seek that most abstract, 
universal and all-inclusive law from which everything else 
can be deduced, then a fortiori “the concept of [our] action 
in itself” also must “already contain a law for [us],” from 
which that particular action similarly can be deduced. His 
Hypothetical Employment of Reason aims to describe the 
empirical procedure by which we ensure that this deductive 
relationship between law and instance is sound, whatever 
the instance might be. 
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This is the reason for the inconsistency noted in Section 
II, between Kant’s purely formal analysis of the moral law, 
and his ascription of it to the will as a forward-looking 
incentive in his third formulation of the categorical “imper-
ative” at passage (5) above. For this consists in the 
injunction to apply the form of reason as itself a method of 
reasoning. Here is the later formulation of the categorical 
“imperative” (the thirty-ninth, according to Appendix Table 
1) that expresses this injunction most explicitly:  
 
(26) But the sentence: the will itself is a law in all 
actions, indicates only the principle to act 
according to no other maxim, than that which 
can also have for an object itself as universal 
law (GMS 04:447.05-08; italics added).51 
 
Here, as in passage (5) and others like it, Kant is speaking to 
the reader who is actively seeking a conscious decision-
making method for determining the right action. He is urg-
ing us to adopt as a forward-looking empirical goal the 
backward-looking intentional attitude of “concern not with 
the matter of the action and what is supposed to result from 
it, but rather with the form and principle from which it itself 
follows.” When he exhorts us to will as a forward-looking, 
goal-directed intentional object that our maxims be univers-
alizable, he is telling us to adopt the formal criterion of 
rationality – bare conformity to law – as itself a concrete em-
pirical procedure for making a decision; whereas when he 
exhorts us simply to will a universalizable maxim, he is 
telling us what that formal criterion is.  
All seven of the “universal law” formulations of the 
categorical “imperative” listed in Appendix Table 4 that 
exhort us to will that our maxims be universalizable urge us 
                                                
51 Der Satz aber: der Wille ist in allen Handlungen sich selbst ein Gesetz, 
bezeichnet nur das Prinzip, nach keiner anderen Maxime zu handeln, als die 
sich selbst auch als ein allgemeines Gesetz zum Gegenstande haben kann 
(GMS 04:447.05-08). 
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to strive to cultivate the backward-looking intentional atti-
tude of respectful attention to the lawlike form of our max-
ims; and to strive to satisfy the three conditions of mindful-
ness that constitute it in every maxim we formulate, as itself 
a procedure for determining what to do. They enjoin on us a 
way of thinking, namely thinking in a lawlike manner, from 
which the right action for us to take at this place and time 
can be rationally derived. Kant sees that we already have the 
capacity for this mode of thought, and that we already 
employ it when reasoning about abstract theoretical subjects. 
He is simply urging us to employ exactly the same mode of 
reasoning about ourselves; to treat ourselves and our actions 
not as exceptions to the universal rules we invariably 
generate, but rather as instances of them. 
So the point of the project in these formulations is not to 
submit our actions to a test of moral validity, or to cast their 
maxims in such a manner as to pass it, or to protect or 
enhance our “stake in our own agency.” Nor are we to strive 
to conform the maxims of our actions to the CI-procedure, 
the CI-Maxim, the Revision Maxim, or anything similar. 
Rather, the point is to strive to adopt the same rational mode 
of thinking about ourselves and our actions as we do about 
any other object of inquiry; indeed, to subordinate the 
provincial, constricting demands of ego and inclination to 
the higher, liberating demands of this more distanced and 
comprehensive mode of thought. Once we become skilled 
and comfortable at regarding ourselves and our actions as 
concrete particulars that succeed or fail gradatim the ob-
jective demands of reason, Kant thinks, the answer to our 
moral questions as to what to do will follow naturally. These 
formulations of the categorical “imperative” recommend 
that we use the same Hypothetical Employment of Reason 
in answering the moral question as in answering any other. 
Kant failed at this project for three reasons. First, it really 
is not possible to derive substantive moral directives from a 
purely formal and functional analysis of reason; this is the 
proverbial “garbage in-garbage out” problem that Deduc-
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tivists always encounter52 and that logicians know as Mill’s 
Paradox of Inference.53 Second, as we have seen, Kant in 
the Groundwork did not distinguish clearly or consistently 
between backward-looking and forward-looking intentional 
attitudes; nor, therefore, between the backward-looking for-
mal conditions a maxim of action must satisfy in order to be 
rational on the one hand, and the pressing forward-looking 
empirical task of deciding whether or not to perform it, 
which its satisfaction of those conditions is supposed to de-
termine, on the other.  
Third, Kant’s taxonomy of the moral duties that the 
contradiction tests are supposed to imply is faulty. If, as the 
                                                
52 I discuss the problem of Deductivism in Rationality and the Structure of 
the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception (Berlin: 
http://adrianpiper.com/rss/docs/Rationality%20and%20the%20Structure%20
of%20the%20Self%20Volume%20I-
%20The%20Humean%20Conception.pdf, APRA Foundation Berlin, 2008), 
Chapter IX. “The Problem of Moral Justification.” 
53 “The maxim …, That whatever can be affirmed (or denied) of a class, may 
be affirmed (or denied) of everything in the class …, supposed to be the basis 
of the syllogistic theory, is termed by logicians the dictum de omni et nullo 
(234). … Now, however, when it is known that a class, an universal, a genus 
or species is not an entity per se, but neither more nor less than the individual 
substances themselves which are placed in the class, and that there is nothing 
real in the matter except those objects, a common name given to them, and 
common attributes indicated by the name; what, I should be glad to know, do 
we learn by being told, that whatever can be affirmed of a class, may be 
affirmed of every object contained in the class? The class is nothing but the 
objects contained in it: and the dictum de omni merely amounts to the 
identical proposition, that whatever is true of certain objects, is true of each 
of those objects. … To give any real meaning to the dictum de omni, we must 
consider it not as an axiom but as a definition; we must look upon it as 
intended to explain, in a circuitous and paraphrastic manner, the meaning of 
the word class (235-6).” John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative 
and Inductive, Volume I (London: John W. Parker, 1843). Cf. also 217-222, 
on the variety of cases in which “the proposition ostensibly inferred from 
another, appears on analysis to be merely a repetition of the same, or part of 
the same, assertion, which was contained in the first (217). … In all these 
cases there is not really any inference; there is in the conclusion no new truth, 
nothing but what was already asserted in the premises, and obvious to 
whoever apprehends them. The fact asserted in the conclusion is either the 
very same fact, or part of the fact, asserted in the original proposition (219).” 
For a contemporary treatment, see Jaakko Hintikka, Logic, Language-Games 
and Information: Kantian Themes in the Philosophy of Logic (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1973 and 2002), 222 on the “scandal of deduction.” 
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first formulation of the categorical imperative claims,54 the 
moral law directs us in moral deliberation always to will a 
universalizable maxim, and our derelict maxim violates the 
moral law, then it produces a contradiction in the will: I both 
want the moral practice to remain in force, and also do not 
want this for my own case. This holds as well for lying as for 
loafing. However, if the contradiction in the will test 
identifies imperfect duties that we have latitude and dis-
cretion about when and how to fulfill, then obedience to the 
moral law is an imperfect duty, and we have that same 
latitude and discretion about when and how to obey it. This 
contradicts Kant’s earlier claim that we are always and only 
to act on those maxims that do obey it. The contradiction 
thus forces a choice between Kant’s analysis of the moral 
law as instantiating a law of reason on the one hand, and his 
taxonomy of the moral duties purportedly derived from it on 
the other. I choose the former: Kant’s warning that we are 
not to short-circuit the ongoing deductive and inductive 
operations of reason for purposes of self-indulgence or self-
aggrandizement expresses the deeper insight into the ess-
ence of vice and virtue.  
 
 
VIII. O’Neill’s Contradiction Tests 
 
evertheless, Kant’s formalism is far from empty. 
His two contradiction tests as O’Neill dissects them 
still yield important conclusions about the limits 
and potentials of rational agency. We see this by scrutinizing 
the passage at GMS Ak. 04:424 directly preceding passage 
(19) above, which O’Neill’s analysis takes as its starting 
point:55 
                                                
54 … (a) I am never to proceed otherwise than (b) such that I could also will 
(c) that my maxim should become a universal law (GMS Ak. 04:402.09-11).” 
In the German original, […] ich soll niemals anders verfahren als so, daß ich 
auch wollen könne, meine Maxime solle ein allgemeines Gesetz werden 
(GMS Ak. 04:402.09-11).“ 
55 Nell, op. cit. Note 4, 60. 
N 
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(27) (a) One must be able to will that a maxim of 
our action become a universal law: (b) this is 
the canon of moral judgment of action in 
general. (c) Some actions are so constituted 
that their maxims cannot even be thought 
without contradiction as a universal law of 
nature, (d) much less willed such that they 
should become one. (e) With others this inner 
impossibility is not to be found, (f) but it is 
impossible to will that their maxim should be 
elevated to the universality of a law of nature, 
(g) because such a will would contradict itself. 
(GMS Ak. 04:424.02-12)56  
 
Clauses (a) and (b) identify the canon of moral judgment in 
general with the formulation of the moral law at passages (5) 
and (26) above: Our maxim of action should represent the 
action as becoming universal law, and we must be able to 
will this as a forward-looking intentional object. This means 
that when seeking consciously to answer the question as to 
what to do, we are to apply the backward-looking rational 
requirement, that the maxims of our will have a lawlike 
character, to the forward-looking intentional object of 
inquiry, namely the matter of how to settle on what to do. 
We are to strive to formulate the maxim of our envisioned 
action in a lawlike manner, such that it exhibits respectful 
attention to the “form and principle from which it itself 
follows,” and therefore passes the Maxim Rationality Test. 
                                                
56 (a) Man muß wollen können, daß eine Maxime unserer Handlung ein 
allgemeines Gesetz werde: (b) dies ist der Kanon der moralischen 
Beurteilung derselben überhaupt. (c) Einige Handlungen sind so beschaffen, 
daß ihre Maxime ohne Widerspruch nicht einmal als allgemeines Naturgesetz 
gedacht werden kann; (d) weit gefehlt, daß man noch wollen könne, sie sollte 
ein solches werden. (e) Bei anderen ist zwar jene innere Unmöglichkeit nicht 
anzutreffen, (f) aber es ist doch unmöglich zu wollen, daß ihre Maxime zur 
Allgemeinheit eines Naturgesetzes erhoben werde, (g) weil ein solcher Wille 
sich selbst widersprechen würde (GMS Ak. 04:424.02-12). 
 
                                                                    KSO 2012: 
 
Adrian M. S. Piper, Kant’s Self-Legislation Procedure 
Reconsidered, KSO 2012: 203--277  
Posted October 20, 2012 www.kantstudiesonline.net 
© 2012 Adrian M. S. Piper & Kant Studies Online Ltd. 
 
 
252 
Thus the canon of moral judgment in general enjoins us to 
strive to formulate our intention in acting as a maxim of 
reason; this, Kant implies, will suffice to answer the question 
as to what to do.  
Clauses (f) and (g) introduce the analysis in passage (19) 
of in what a contradiction in the will consists. We have 
already seen that our attempt to conform the maxim of our 
derelict intention to the rationality requirements of the Regu-
lative Principle of Pure Reason creates a contradiction be-
tween this manner of willing and that in which “we do not 
really will” its universalizability. I have argued above in 
Section VI that this is not a contradiction embedded within a 
forward-looking intentional object, such that Pw[(∃a)(x)Fx . 
~Fa], nor a conjunction of two incompatible intentional 
objects, such that Pw[(x)Fx] . Pw[~Fa]; but rather a 
straightforward logical contradiction between two contra-
dictory backward-looking intentional attitudes, such that 
Pw[(x)Fx] . ~Pw[(x)Fx]. The implication is that when Kant 
maintains that “it is impossible to will that their maxim 
should be [universal] … because such a will would contra-
dict itself” [clauses (f) and (g) above], that is exactly what he 
means: not that the object of the will would contradict itself, 
but rather that the will itself would contradict itself.  
However, when we consciously apply the canon of moral 
judgment in order to ascertain the moral acceptability of a 
derelict maxim such as  
 
(28) ~Fa: I will not help others in need,  
 
we generate the intentional representation of this contradic-
tion as itself the forward-looking object of our will:  
 
(29) Pw{Pw[(x)Fx] . ~Pw[(x)Fx]}.  
 
Here I want both to will the universalizability of the negation 
of my derelict maxim, namely the pre-existing moral 
principle – so as to enjoy the benefits of others’ help; and 
also not to will its universalizability – so as to enjoy the 
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benefits of not reciprocating it. This is, in effect, to will a 
self-contradictory intentional object, namely that contra-
diction in the will itself. When Kant then says in clause (f) 
that it is “impossible” to will in this manner, and in clause 
(g) that this is “because such a will would contradict itself,” 
he means simply to point out that it is logically, conceptually 
impossible to will a will that contradicts itself. Thus is the 
irrationality of “our own will” [passage (19), clauses (g)-(i)] 
made visible to us in conscious deliberation. 
Now for a closer look at clauses (c) and (d) of passage 
(27). These describe a second kind of case, to which Kant’s 
analysis at passage (19) applies equally well: I both will the 
pre-existing moral principle and, in order to exempt my own 
action, “do not really will” it. But in this case, my appli-
cation of the canon of moral judgment in general to the 
derelict maxim multiplies the contradiction fourfold. For 
now, not only do I will a conjunction of two contradictory 
willings as a forward-looking intentional object, as in 
formula (29). Now the forward-looking intentional objects 
of my two contradictory willings themselves also contradict 
themselves: The very “concept of [my] action in itself [as] 
already contain[ing] a law for me” is internally contradict-
tory. There can be no manner of willing this maxim itself for 
which a backward-looking intentional attitude of “concer[n] 
… with the form and principle from which it itself follows” 
could be cultivated, because the maxim as universalized has 
no coherent form and there is no consistent principle from 
which it follows. The universalization of this kind of derelict 
maxim is literally inconceivable.  
The best example of this kind of action is the one Kant 
discusses directly following his first formulation of the 
categorical imperative at GMS Ak. 04:402.09-11, which he 
describes as a “lying promise” (GMS Ak. 04:403.04), and 
elaborates further at GMS Ak. 04:422.18-44. I am going to 
abide by Kant’s initial description of this as a false promise, 
in order to sift out the complexities that attach to his analyses 
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of lying and dishonesty more generally.57 Rather, I want to 
focus specifically on the case in which, as Kant describes it, 
I will “make a promise with the intention of not keeping it” 
(GMS Ak. 04:402.20). When I try to universalize this max-
im in the counterfactual thought experiment in which every-
one makes promises with the intention of not keeping them, 
I find that the envisioned universal practice is not one of 
promising of any kind, but instead consists in a meaningless 
utterance without social effect. As Kant says,  
 
(30) [I]n accordance with such a universal law 
                                                
57 The main problem I find with Kant’s arguments against lying is that it is 
easy to imagine a world in which everybody lies all the time, so long as not 
everybody admits it. A world in which everyone in fact hates themselves, 
their lives and one another, yet systematically avows and otherwise 
represents exactly the opposite, in order to lure in the unsuspecting to share 
the burden of their misery would illustrate such a possibility. False promising 
is different because the behavioral breach itself usually reveals the derelict-
tion; whereas the failure to tell the truth may never come to light, so long as 
everyone cooperates in concealing it – for example, in order not to look 
foolish for having been duped in the first place, or to justify with each new 
recruit having been duped themselves. Thus a universal practice of lying 
would pass the contradiction in conception test, although a specific instance 
of it – false promising – would not. Thus I take issue here with O’Neill’s 
argument that:  
 
falsehood in communication could not serve as a universal principle 
for communications among a plurality of rational beings … [be-
cause] comprehension itself would cease, and so also the possibility 
of communication. … [T]he very possibility of recognizing what is 
said in such contexts as falsehood presupposes comprehensibility, 
and thus also that standards of truth telling obtain more generally in 
those communities (Constructions of Reason: Explorations of 
Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), Chapter 2. “The Public Use of Reason,” 45). 
 
Systematic falsehood – of the sort we practice on children in order to shield 
them from ugly realities, or on those we mean to use in ways to which they 
would not consent if consulted, for example – would not, so far as I can see, 
cause comprehension or communication to cease. As to whether anyone 
recognizes what is said under such circumstances as falsehood, this is beside 
the point. “Sugaring the pill,” “spinning the bad news,” “saving face,” “doing 
damage control,” etc. are only a few of the favored alternative practices that 
do just as well. See my “Kant’s Two Solutions to the Free Rider Problem,” 
The Kant Yearbook 4/2012: Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 113-
142 for an extended discussion. 
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there actually would be no promising at all, for 
it would be futile to profess my will with 
regard to my future actions to others who 
would not believe me … (GMS Ak. 
04:403.14-18); … [it] would make  
promising and the very point of promising  
itself impossible, as no one would believe they 
were promised anything … (GMS Ak.  
04:423.40-44).58  
 
In this case, when I consciously apply the canon of moral 
judgment to my derelict maxim as a forward-looking inten-
tional object, I find I am willing both a universal practice of 
false promising and thereby its negation:  
 
(31) Pw[(x)(~Fxà~~Fx)]. 
 
But remember that I am both willing this practice and also 
not willing it: 
 
(32) Pw[(x)(~Fx à ~~Fx)] . 
~Pw[(x)(~Fx à ~~Fx)], 
 
and, in addition, consciously applying the canon of moral 
judgment in order to determine its moral acceptability: 
 
(33) Pw{Pw[(x)(~Fx à ~~Fx)] . 
~Pw[(x)(~Fx à~~Fx)]}. 
 
What a mess!  
 
                                                
58 […] denn nach einem solchen würde es eigentlich gar kein Versprechen 
geben, weil es vergeblich wäre, meinen Willen in Ansehung meiner 
künftigen Handlungen anderen vorzugeben, die diesem Vorgeben doch nicht 
glauben […] würden […] (GMS Ak. 04:403.14-18) […] [es] würde das 
Versprechen und den Zweck, den man damit haben mag, selbst unmöglich 
machen, indem niemand glauben würde, daß ihm was versprochen sei […] 
(GMS Ak. 04:423.40-44). 
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IX. Millgram’s Test of Reflexive Application 
Reconsidered 
 
ant’s argument that false promising cannot be uni-
versalized proposes a resolution to the Free Rider 
problem. Hobbes’ Foole59 was the first to reason 
that if self-interest justifies exchanging the state of nature for 
the Social Contract, then self-interest also justifies violating 
the Social Contract for personal gain. The Free Rider, then, 
makes a really quite important promise, namely to obey the 
rules as consensually agreed, with the intention of not keep-
ing it when that is to her benefit. She takes advantage of 
others’ sacrifice of immediate self-interest in order to ad-
vance her own. Kant was fully aware of the coordination 
problem posed by Hobbes’ Foole, and offered a two-
pronged solution to it. I discuss Kant’s application of the 
solution he offers at KrV, A 751/B 779.30-40 and A 752/B 
780.01-14 to passage (19) at greater length elsewhere.60 As 
we have just seen in Section VIII, Kant’s argument in pass-
ages (19) and (27) conjointly is that the Free Rider induces 
in herself not merely a contradiction in her will, but also a 
straightforwardly logical contradiction in her conception of 
what it is she is intending to do: Formulas (31) – (33) 
express the case in which she both does and also does not 
will both to break a promise and not to break it, therefore 
neither to break it nor to keep it; both to presuppose and to 
deny a consensual practice of promise-keeping; both to 
invoke and to reject this practice to rationalize her derelict 
intention. She thereby short-circuits the very powers of rea-
soning she meant to harness in the service of self-interest. 
Thus Kant critiques the Free Rider’s reasoning by showing 
that false promising is individually irrational in this double 
sense: It fails to advance her self-interest, because it actively 
undermines the cognitive coherence of the self whose in-
                                                
59 Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: 
Macmillan/Collier Books, 1977), 115-117. 
60 “Kant’s Two Solutions to the Free Rider Problem,” op. cit. Note 57. 
K 
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terest it is; and this is a direct consequence of the conflict 
between her attempt to particularize her situation on the one 
hand, and her attempt to rationally justify it by univers-
alizing its principles on the other. Were all such agents in the 
state of nature to reason similarly, no Social Contract could 
be established because, as Kant observes, “actually there 
then would be no promising” at all (GMS Ak. 04:403.15) 
and hence no shared rules to obey.  
So just as O’Neill’s contradiction in the will test tracks a 
criterion of maxim rationality rather than one of maxim 
morality, similarly her contradiction in conception test tracks 
a criterion of regulative coherence rather than one of justice. 
It does not show that false promising is always unjust. 
Rather, it shows that false promising cannot be an intelli-
gible object of regulation, whether of self or of society. In 
order for the concept of a false promise to be meaningful, it 
must presuppose a shared linguistic convention in which the 
concept of a true promise denotes a widespread, motivation-
ally effective social convention. Sabotaging this convention 
in turn sabotages the linguistic convention, and the per-
formative concept of a promise loses its meaning. Hence the 
force of the failure of universalizability in this case is its de-
monstration that, prior to and independent of information 
availability constraints on everyone’s goals, rules and poli-
cies and any interpersonal coordination problems that 
might result from them, the very form of theoretical reason 
itself excludes such conjoint and simultaneous self-
interested behavior among the members of a community. 
O’Neill’s contradiction in conception test, applied to the 
example of false promising, refutes the presuppositions of 
the game-theoretic account of the origins of interpersonal 
coordination on which Millgram’s critique relies. Surely this 
is achievement enough.  
Recall that Millgram’s critique took its cue from the New 
Kantian line, that the CI-procedure rejects as morally un-
acceptable those actions that are “practically inconsistent,” 
i.e. that thwart “one’s stake in one’s own agency (529-533).” 
One’s stake in one’s own agency is of course not merely any 
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old self-interest, but perhaps the most profound interest in 
one’s self one can take. Millgram’s response was to show 
that, on the contrary, it is the CI-procedure itself that thwarts 
this most basic self-interest. He began with the prima facie 
palatable thought that, as self-interested agents, we each 
need the cooperation of other self-interested agents in order 
to achieve our ends, and must try to achieve them largely in 
ignorance of others’ ends, policies and rules – thus requiring 
exceptions to those rules as a matter of principle. But Kant’s 
analysis of the false promising case at passage (30) shows 
that such exceptions cannot be a matter of principle, not 
even New Kantian principle. Millgram’s argument, that self-
interest justifies breaking the rules when necessary to 
advance one’s ends, is a simple variation on the Free Rider 
principle, that self-interest justifies breaking the rules for 
personal gain. It implies that self-interest takes rational 
priority over, and is conceptually prior to, following the 
rules; and that such rules are defeasible as a matter of 
principle by considerations of personal advantage. O’Neill’s 
contradiction in conception test tells us, by contrast, that the 
Free Rider’s reasoning – and so the reasoning on which 
Millgram’s critique depends – is, when elevated to the status 
of principle, logically incoherent. It tells us that self-interest 
cannot be conceptually prior to following the rules, and 
therefore cannot provide principled guidelines for when they 
are to be followed and when they are to be broken. 
Now Millgram concludes his discussion by chiding the 
New Kantians for failing to observe his test of reflexive 
application: 
 
(34) When you are working up your philosophical 
theory, always stop to check what happens 
when you apply that theory to itself. 
Sometimes that operation will not so much as 
make sense. Sometimes the result will be fast 
and reassuring. But sometimes, as we have 
just seen, it will not, and so the text of 
reflective application is not one that you can 
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afford to neglect. (550) 
 
But the application of Millgram’s own theory to itself is 
anything but “fast and reassuring.” Part of that theory was a 
quite compelling argument that he made against the New 
Kantians, that exceptions cannot be built into the principle 
they violate, on pain of self-defeat, either specifically or 
generically, because this thwarted the universalization of the 
exempted action’s maxim. Of course Millgram does not 
have to universalize his maxims, at least on his view. In that 
case, he is free to allow as many promising students as he 
likes to skip class and graduate anyway. But if he means to 
allow any such exception on principle, then the principle 
must be precisely that which we now see is the Free Rider 
principle. And this is the principle that O’Neill’s contra-
diction in conception test reveals as logically incoherent. 
The test shows that if particular exceptions cannot be built 
into the particular rules they break, then a fortiori the generic 
concept of an exception cannot be built into the generic 
concept of a rule it breaks, either. It shows that if everyone 
reasoned as Millgram does, there would be no rules to break. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table 1: 
 
47 Formulations of the Moral Law in Kant’s 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 
 
This table contains all formulations in the order in which they appear in the text, 
whether in the form of commands, imperatives, questions or assertions. The list aims 
to be exhaustive. Subsequent tables cull further categories from this list: (2) 
formulations in the imperative; (3) universal law formulations; (4) intentional-object 
universal law formulations; (5) manner-of-willing universal law formulations; and (6) 
miscellaneous universal law formulations. 
 
No. German English Citation 
GMS Ak. 04: 
1 [...] [I]ch soll niemals anders verfahren als 
so, daß ich auch wollen könne, meine 
Maxime solle ein allgemeines Gesetz 
werden. 
I am never to proceed otherwise than such 
that I could also will that my maxim should 
become a universal law. 
402.09-11 
2 Kannst du auch wollen, daß deine Maxime 
ein allgemeines Gesetz werde? 
Can you also will that your maxim become a 
universal law? 
403.26-27 
3 [S]o bleibt nichts als die Allgemeinheit eines 
Gesetzes überhaupt übrig, welchem die 
Maxime der Handlung gemäß sein soll, und 
welche Gemäßheit allein der Imperative 
eigentlich als notwendig vorstellt. 
[N]othing remains to which the maxim of the 
action shall conform except the universality 
of a law in general; and which conformity 
alone the imperative actually represents as 
necessary. 
421.03-06 
4 [H]andle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, 
durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie 
ein allgemeines Gesetz werde. 
Act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law. 
421.08-09 
5 [H]andle so, als ob die Maxime deiner 
Handlung durch deinen Willen z u m 
a l lgemeinen  Naturgese tze  werden 
sollte. 
So act as though the maxims of your action 
should become UNIVERSAL LAWS OF NATURE 
through your will. 
421.21-23 
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6 Man muß wollen können, daß eine Maxime 
unserer Handlung ein allgemeines Gesetz 
werde [...]. 
One must be able to will that a maxim of our 
action become a universal law … . 
424.02-03 
7 [...] daß wir wirklich nicht wollen, es solle 
unsere Maxime ein allgemeines Gesetz 
werden, [...] 
… that we do not really will such that our 
maxim should become a universal law, . . . 
424.19-20 
8 [D]er Mensch und überhaupt jedes 
vernünftige Wesen existiert als Zweck an sich 
selbst, nicht bloß als Mittel zum beliebigen 
Gebrauche für diesen oder jenen Willen, 
sondern muß in allen seinen sowohl auf sich 
selbst als auch auf anderen vernünftige 
Wesen gerichteten Handlungen jederzeit 
zugleich als Zweck betrachtet werden. 
A human being and generally every rational 
being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a 
means for the arbitrary use of this or that will. 
Rather, in all its actions, whether directed 
towards itself or also towards other rational 
beings, it must always be considered at the 
same time as an end. 
428.09-14 
9 Handle so, daß du die Menschheit, sowohl in 
deiner Person als in der Person eines jeden 
anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, 
niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst. 
So act, that you use humanity, in your own 
person as well as in the person of anyone 
else, always at the same time as an end, never 
merely as a means. 
429.12-14 
10 [...] die Idee des Willens jedes vernünftigen 
Wesens als eines allgemein gesetzgebenden 
Willens. 
… the idea of the will of every rational being 
as a universal lawmaking will. 
431.20-22 
11 [...] die Idee des Willens eines jeden 
vernünftigen Wesens als 
allgemeingesetzgebenden Willens. 
… the idea of the will of each and every 
rational being as a universal lawmaking will.  
432.03-04 
12 [...] das Prinzip eines jeden menschlichen 
Willens als eines durch alle seine Maximen 
allgemein gesetzgebenden Willens [...]. 
… the principle of each and every human will 
as a will that makes universal law through all 
of its maxims … . 
432.14-16 
13 [...] daß es, eben um der Idee der allgemeinen 
Gesetzgebung willen, sich auf kein Interesse 
gründet und als unter allen möglichen 
Imperativen allein unbedingt sein kann [...] 
… precisely for the sake of universal 
legislation, it is not grounded on any interest 
and among all possible imperatives alone can 
be unconditioned … . 
432.17-20 
14 [...] wenn es einen kategorischen Imperativ 
gibt (d.i. ein Gesetz für jeden Willen eines 
vernünftigen Wesens) [...] 
… [i]f there is a categorical imperative (i.e. a 
law for every will of a rational being) … . 
432.21-23 
15 [...] so kann er nur gebieten, alles aus der 
Maxime seines Willens als eines solchen zu 
tun, der zugleich sich selbst als allgemein 
gesetzgebend zum Gegenstand haben könnte 
[...] 
… it can only command to do everything 
from the maxims of its will as one that at the 
same time could have as its object itself as 
universally lawmaking … .  
432.23-25 
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16 [...] daß er nur seiner eigenen und dennoch 
allgemeinen Gesetzgebung unterworfen sei  
[...] 
… that [the human being] is subject only to 
her own and yet universal legislation … . 
432.33-34 
17 [...] daß er nur verbunden sei, seinem eigenen, 
dem Naturzwecke nach aber allgemein 
gesetzgebenden Willen gemäß zu handeln. 
… that he is only bound to act according to 
natural ends, but in conformity with a 
universally lawmaking will. 
432.34-36 
18 Der Begriff eines jeden vernünftigen Wesens, 
das sich durch alle Maximen seines Willens 
als allgemein gesetzgebend betrachten muß, 
[...]. 
The concept of each and every rational being 
that must consider itself as universally 
lawmaking through all of the maxims of its 
will … . 
433.15-17 
19 [V]ernünftige Wesen stehen alle unter dem 
Gesetz, daß jedes derselben sich selbst und 
alles anderen niemals bloß als Mittel, sondern 
jederzeit zugleich als Zweck an sich selbst 
behandeln solle. 
All rational beings stand under the law that 
each of them should treat itself and every 
other never simply as means, but rather 
always at the same time as an end in itself. 
433.31-34 
20 Das vernünftige Wesen muß sich jederzeit als 
gesetzgebend in einem durch Freiheit des 
Willens möglichen Reiche der Zwecke 
betrachten [...]. 
A rational being must always consider itself 
as lawmaking in a realm of ends possible 
through the freedom of the will … . 
434.01-04 
21 [...] keine Handlung nach einer anderen 
Maxime zu tun als so, daß es auch mit ihr 
bestehen könne, daß sie ein allgemeines 
Gesetz sei, [...] 
… to perform no action according to any 
other maxim than such that it could be 
consistent with its being a universal law, … . 
434.12-14 
22 [...] und also nur so, daß der Wille durch seine 
Maxime sich selbst zugleich als allgemein 
gesetzgebend betrachten könne. 
… and thus only such that the will through its 
maxim could consider itself at the same time 
as universally lawmaking.  
434.14-16 
23 [...] daß die Maximen so müssen gewählt 
werden, als ob sie wie allgemeine 
Naturgesetze gelten sollten [...]. 
… that the maxims must be so chosen as 
though they should be valid as universal laws 
of nature … . 
436.19-21 
24 [...] daß das vernünftige Wesen als Zweck 
seiner Natur nach, mithin als Zweck an sich 
selbst, jeder Maxime zur einschränkenden 
Bedingung aller bloß relativen und 
willkürlichen Zwecke dienen müsse [...]. 
… that a rational being in accordance with its 
nature as an end, and consequently as an end 
in itself, must serve every maxim as the 
limiting condition of all merely relative and 
arbitrary ends … . 
436.23-26 
25 [...] daß alle Maximen aus eigener 
Gesetzgebung zu einem möglichen Reiche 
der Zwecke, als einem Reiche der Natur, 
zusammenstimmen sollen. 
… that all maxims out of one’s own 
legislation are to harmonize in a possible 
realm of ends, as a realm of nature.  
436.28-30 
26 [H]andle nach der Maxime, die sich selbst 
zugleich zum allgemeinen Gesetze machen 
kann. 
Act according to the maxim that can make 
itself at the same time into a universal law.  
437.01-02 
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27 [H]andle jederzeit nach derjenigen Maxime, 
deren Allgemeinheit als Gesetzes du zugleich 
wollen kannst [...]. 
Always act according to that maxim whose 
universality as law you can at the same time 
will … . 
437.12-14 
28 Handle nach Maximen, die sich selbst 
zugleich als allgemeine Naturgesetze zum 
Gegenstand haben können.  
Act according to maxims that can at the same 
time have as their object themselves as 
universal laws of nature 
437.21-23 
29 [H]andle in Beziehung auf ein jedes 
vernünftige Wesen (auf dich selbst und 
andere) so, daß es in deiner Maxime zugleich 
als Zweck an sich selbst gelte [...] 
Act in relation to a rational being (yourself 
and others) such that in your maxim it would 
at the same time count as an end in itself … . 
437.40-41 
30 [H]andle nach einer Maxime, die ihre eigene 
allgemeine Gültigkeit für jedes vernünftige 
Wesen zugleich in sich enthält [...]. 
Act according to a maxim that at the same 
time contains within itself its own universal 
validity for every rational being … . 
438.02-04 
31 [...] daß ich meine Maxime im Gebrauche der 
Mittel zu jedem Zwecke auf die Bedingung 
ihrer Allgemeingültigkeit als eines Gesetzes 
für jedes Subjekt einschränken soll [...] 
… that in their use as means to any ends, I am 
to limit my maxims to the condition of their 
universal validity as a law for every subject 
… . 
438.04-07 
32 [D]as Subjekt der Zwecke d.i. das vernünftige 
Wesen selbst muß niemals bloß als Mittel, 
sondern als oberste einschränkende 
Bedingung im Gebrauche aller Mittel, d.i. 
jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, allen Maximen 
der Handlungen zum Grunde gelegt werden. 
[T]he subject of ends, i.e. the rational being 
itself, must be made the foundation of all 
maxims of actions, never simply as means, 
but rather as the supreme limiting condition of 
the use of all means, i.e. always at the same 
time as an end.  
438.07-11 
33 [...] daß jedes vernünftige Wesen als Zweck 
an sich selbst sich in Ansehung aller Gesetze, 
denen es nur immer unterworfen sein mag, 
zugleich als allgemein gesetzgebend müsse 
ansehen können [...] 
… that every rational being, as an end in 
itself, must only be able to see itself as at the 
same time universally lawmaking, with 
regard to any laws whatever to which it may 
be subject … . 
438.12-15 
34 Demnach muß ein jedes vernünftige Wesen 
so handeln, als ob es durch seine Maximen 
jederzeit ein gesetzgebendes Glied im 
allgemeinen Reiche der Zwecke wäre. 
Accordingly, each and every rational being 
must thus act as though it were, through its 
maxims, always a lawmaking member in a 
universal realm of ends. 
438.25-27 
35 Das Prinzip der Autonomie ist also: nicht 
anders zu wählen als so, daß die Maximen 
seiner Wahl in demselben Wollen zugleich 
als allgemeines Gesetz mit begriffen seien. 
The principle of autonomy is thus: not to 
choose otherwise than so that the maxims of 
its choice are at the same time comprehended 
as universal law in the same willing. 
440.20-23 
36 Dagegen sagt der moralische, mithin 
kategorische Imperativ: ich soll so oder so 
handeln, ob ich gleich nichts anders wollte. 
By contrast, the moral, and consequently 
categorical imperative says: I am to act thus 
and so, whether or not I wanted anything else.  
441.12-14 
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37 [D]ie Tauglichkeit der Maxime eines jeden 
guten Willens, sich selbst zum allgemeinen 
Gesetze zu machen, ist selbst das alleinige 
Gesetz, das sich der Wille eines jeden 
vernünftigen Wesens selbst auferlegt [...]. 
The suitability of the maxims of every good 
will to make itself into universal law is itself 
the only law that the will of every rational 
being imposes on itself … . 
444.35-38 
38 [D]er Wille ist in allen Handlungen sich selbst 
ein Gesetz [...] 
[T]he will itself is a law in all actions … . 447.04-05 
39 [...] das Prinzip, nach keiner anderen Maxime 
zu handeln als die sich selbst auch als ein 
allgemeines Gesetz zum Gegenstande haben 
kann. 
… the principle to act according to no other 
maxim, than that which can also have for an 
object itself as universal law. 
447.05-08 
40 [E]in schlechterdings guter Wille ist 
derjenige, dessen Maxime jederzeit sich 
selbst, als allgemeines Gesetz betrachtet, in 
sich enthalten kann [...]. 
[A]n absolutely good will is one whose 
maxims always can always contain itself 
considered as universal law … . 
447.14-16 
41 [...] daß die subjektiven Grundsätze der 
Handlungen, d.i. Maximen jederzeit so 
genommen werden müssen, daß sie auch 
objektiv, d.i. allgemein als Grundsätze gelten, 
mithin zu unserer eigenen allgemeinen 
Gesetzgebung dienen können. 
… that the subjective principles of actions, i.e. 
maxims, must always be taken in such a way 
that they also count as objective, i.e. universal 
principles, and consequently can serve for our 
own universal legislation.  
449.10-14 
42 Weil aber die Verstandeswelt [...] also in 
Ansehung meines Willens [...] unmittelbar 
gesetzgebend ist und also auch als solche 
gedacht werden muß, so werde ich mich als 
Intelligenz, [...] folglich die Gesetze der 
Verstandeswelt für mich als Imperativen und 
die diesem Prinzip gemäßen Handlungen als 
Pflichten ansehen müssen. 
Because the world of understanding … thus 
in regard to my will … is directly lawmaking 
and therefore also must be thought as such, 
thus I will have to regard myself as 
intelligence, and hence regard the laws of the 
world of understanding as imperatives for me 
and the actions according to this principle as 
obligations.  
453.37, 39-
40; 454.01, 
05-08 
43 [...] so zu handeln, daß das Prinzip der 
Handlungen der wesentlich Beschaffenheit 
einer Vernunftursache, d.i. der Bedingung der 
Allgemeingültigkeit der Maxime als eines 
Gesetzes gemäß sei. 
… to act in such a way that the principle of 
actions is in accordance with the essential 
quality of a rational cause, i.e. with the 
condition of universal validity of the maxim 
as a law.  
458.15-18 
44 [...] macht den Begriff einer intelligibelen 
Welt [...] notwendig, [...] als bloß ihrer 
formalen Bedingung nach, d.i. der 
Allgemeinheit der Maxim des Willens als 
Gesetzes, mithin der Autonomie des letzteren 
[...]. 
… makes necessary the concept of an 
intelligible world, … as simply according to 
its formal condition, i.e. the universality of the 
maxim of the will as law, consequently the 
autonomy of the latter … . 
458.32-33, 
34, 35-36 
45 [S]o ist die Erklärung, wie und warum uns die 
Allgemeinheit der Maxime als Gesetzes, 
mithin die Sittlichkeit interessiere, uns 
Menschen gänzlich unmöglich. 
[T]hus the explanation of how and why the 
universality of the maxim as law, and 
consequently morality, would interest us, is 
entirely impossible for us human beings. 
460.26-29 
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46 [W]ie das bloße Prinzip der 
Allgemeingültigkeit aller ihrer Maximen als 
Gesetze [...] für sich selbst eine Triebfeder 
abgeben [...]. 
[H]ow the simple principle of the universal 
validity of all of [human reason’s] maxims as 
law … by itself yields an incentive … . 
461.31-32, 
35-36 
47 Von der reinen Vernunft, [...] bleibt nach 
Absonderung aller Materie, d.i. Erkenntniß 
der Objecte mir nichts als die Form übrig, 
nämlich das praktische Gesetz der 
Allgemeingültigkeit der Maximen [...]. 
After culling all matter from pure reason, i.e. 
cognition of objects, nothing remains to me 
other than its form, namely the practical law 
of the universal validity of maxims … . 
462.15-16, 
16-17, 17-19 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: 
 
These two tables contain all formulations that use forms of sollen to 
modify wollen- or handeln-type verbs. 
 
 
2.1. Four Strict Imperative (sollen) Formulations 
of the Moral Law in Kant’s Groundwork of the 
Metaphysic of Morals 
 
No. German English Citation 
GMS Ak. 04: 
1 [I]ch soll niemals anders verfahren als so, 
daß ich auch wollen könne, meine Maxime 
solle ein allgemeines Gesetz werden. 
I am never to proceed otherwise than such 
that I could also will that my maxim should 
become a universal law. 
402.09-11 
25 [...] daß alle Maximen aus eigener 
Gesetzgebung zu einem möglichen Reiche 
der Zwecke, als einem Reiche der Natur, 
zusammenstimmen sollen. 
… that all maxims out of one’s own 
legislation are to harmonize in a possible 
realm of ends, as a realm of nature.  
436.28-30 
31 [...] daß ich meine Maxime im Gebrauche 
der Mittel zu jedem Zwecke auf die 
Bedingung ihrer Allgemeingültigkeit als 
eines Gesetzes für jedes Subjekt 
einschränken soll [...] 
… that in their use as means to any ends, I 
am to limit my maxims to the condition of 
their universal validity as a law for every 
subject … . 
438.04-07 
36 Dagegen sagt der moralische, mithin 
kategorische Imperativ: ich soll so oder so 
handeln, ob ich gleich nichts anders wollte. 
By contrast, the moral, and consequently 
categorical imperative says: I am to act thus 
and so, whether or not I wanted anything 
else.  
441.12-14 
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2.2. Two Subjunctive I Imperative (solle, sollten) 
Formulations of the Moral Law in Kant’s Groundwork of 
the Metaphysic of Morals 
 
 
No. German English Citation 
GMS Ak. 04: 
7 [...] daß wir wirklich nicht wollen, es solle 
unsere Maxime ein allgemeines Gesetz 
werden, [...] 
… that we do not really will such that our 
maxim should become a universal law, . . . 
424.19-20 
19 [V]ernünftige Wesen stehen alle unter dem 
Gesetz, daß jedes derselben sich selbst und 
alles anderen niemals bloß als Mittel, 
sondern jederzeit zugleich als Zweck an sich 
selbst behandeln solle. 
All rational beings stand under the law that 
each of them should treat itself and every 
other never simply as means, but rather 
always at the same time as an end in itself. 
433.31-34 
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Table 3: 
 
38 Universal Law Formulations of the Moral Law in Kant’s 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 
 
This table contains all formulations that characterize the moral law as 
a universal law, whether embedded in passages discussing 
universalizability, autonomy, ends in themselves, the kingdom of ends, 
or other topics. 
 
No. German English Citation 
GMS Ak. 04: 
1 [I]ch soll niemals anders verfahren als so, daß 
ich auch wollen könne, meine Maxime solle ein 
allgemeines Gesetz werden. 
I am never to proceed otherwise than such that 
I could also will that my maxim should become 
a universal law. 
402.09-11 
2 Kannst du auch wollen, daß deine Maxime ein 
allgemeines Gesetz werde? 
Can you also will, that your maxim become a 
universal law? 
403.26-27 
3 [S]o bleibt nichts als die Allgemeinheit eines 
Gesetzes überhaupt übrig, welchem die 
Maxime der Handlung gemäß sein soll, und 
welche Gemäßheit allein der Imperative 
eigentlich als notwendig vorstellt. 
[N]othing remains to which the maxim of the 
action shall conform except the universality of 
a law in general; and which conformity alone 
the imperative actually represents as necessary. 
421.03-06 
4 [H]andle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch 
die du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie ein 
allgemeines Gesetz werde. 
Act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law. 
421.08-09 
5 [H]andle so, als ob die Maxime deiner 
Handlung durch deinen Willen z u m 
a l lgemeinen  Naturgese tze  werden 
sollte. 
So act as though the maxims of your action 
should become UNIVERSAL LAWS OF NATURE 
through your will. 
421.21-23 
6 Man muß wollen können, daß eine Maxime 
unserer Handlung ein allgemeines Gesetz 
werde [...]. 
One must be able to will that a maxim of our 
action become a universal law … . 
424.02-03 
7 [...] daß wir wirklich nicht wollen, es solle 
unsere Maxime ein allgemeines Gesetz 
werden, [...] 
… that we do not really will such that our 
maxim should become a universal law, . . . 
424.19-20 
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10 [...] die Idee des Willens jedes vernünftigen 
Wesens als eines allgemein gesetzgebenden 
Willens. 
… the idea of the will of every rational being as 
a universal lawmaking will. 
431.20-22 
11 [...] die Idee des Willens eines jeden 
vernünftigen Wesens als 
allgemeingesetzgebenden Willens. 
… the idea of the will of each and every rational 
being as a universal lawmaking will.  
432.03-04 
12 [...] das Prinzip eines jeden menschlichen 
Willens als eines durch alle seine Maximen 
allgemein gesetzgebenden Willens [...]. 
… the principle of each and every human will as 
a will that makes universal law through all of its 
maxims … . 
432.14-16 
13 [...] daß es, eben um der Idee der allgemeinen 
Gesetzgebung willen, sich auf kein Interesse 
gründet und als unter allen möglichen 
Imperativen allein unbedingt sein kann [...] 
… precisely for the sake of universal legislation, 
it is not grounded on any interest and among all 
possible imperatives alone can be unconditioned 
… . 
432.17-20 
14 [...] wenn es einen kategorischen Imperativ gibt 
(d.i. ein Gesetz für jeden Willen eines 
vernünftigen Wesens) [...] 
… [i]f there is a categorical imperative (i.e. a law 
for every will of a rational being) … . 
432.21-23 
15 [...] so kann er nur gebieten, alles aus der 
Maxime seines Willens als eines solchen zu 
tun, der zugleich sich selbst als allgemein 
gesetzgebend zum Gegenstand haben könnte 
[...] 
… it can only command to do everything from 
the maxims of its will as one that at the same 
time could have as its object itself as universally 
lawmaking … .  
432.23-25 
16 [...] daß er nur seiner eigenen und dennoch 
allgemeinen Gesetzgebung unterworfen sei  
[...] 
… that [the human being] is subject only to her 
own and yet universal legislation … . 
432.33-34 
17 [...] daß er nur verbunden sei, seinem eigenen, 
dem Naturzwecke nach aber allgemein 
gesetzgebenden Willen gemäß zu handeln. 
… that he is only bound to act according to 
natural ends, but in conformity with a 
universally lawmaking will. 
432.34-36 
18 Der Begriff eines jeden vernünftigen Wesens, 
das sich durch alle Maximen seines Willens als 
allgemein gesetzgebend betrachten muß, [...]. 
The concept of each and every rational being 
that must consider itself as universally 
lawmaking through all of the maxims of its will 
… . 
433.15-17 
19 [V]ernünftige Wesen stehen alle unter dem 
Gesetz, daß jedes derselben sich selbst und 
alles anderen niemals bloß als Mittel, sondern 
jederzeit zugleich als Zweck an sich selbst 
behandeln solle. 
All rational beings stand under the law that each 
of them should treat itself and every other never 
simply as means, but rather always at the same 
time as an end in itself. 
433.31-34 
21 [...] keine Handlung nach einer anderen 
Maxime zu tun als so, daß es auch mit ihr 
bestehen könne, daß sie ein allgemeines Gesetz 
sei, [...] 
… to perform no action according to any other 
maxim than such that it could be consistent with 
its being a universal law, … . 
434.12-14 
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22 [...] und also nur so, daß der Wille durch seine 
Maxime sich selbst zugleich als allgemein 
gesetzgebend betrachten könne. 
… and thus only such that the will through its 
maxim could consider itself at the same time as 
universally lawmaking.  
434.14-16 
23 [...] daß die Maximen so müssen gewählt 
werden, als ob sie wie allgemeine Naturgesetze 
gelten sollten [...]. 
… that the maxims must be so chosen as though 
they should be valid as universal laws of nature 
… . 
436.19-21 
26 [H]andle nach der Maxime, die sich selbst 
zugleich zum allgemeinen Gesetze machen 
kann. 
Act according to the maxim that can make itself 
at the same time into a universal law.  
437.01-02 
27 [H]andle jederzeit nach derjenigen Maxime, 
deren Allgemeinheit als Gesetzes du zugleich 
wollen kannst [...]. 
Always act according to that maxim whose 
universality as law you can at the same time will 
… . 
437.12-14 
28 Handle nach Maximen, die sich selbst zugleich 
als allgemeine Naturgesetze zum Gegenstand 
haben können.  
Act according to maxims that can at the same 
time have as their object themselves as universal 
laws of nature 
437.21-23 
30 [H]andle nach einer Maxime, die ihre eigene 
allgemeine Gültigkeit für jedes vernünftige 
Wesen zugleich in sich enthält [...]. 
Act according to a maxim that at the same time 
contains within itself its own universal validity 
for every rational being … . 
438.02-04 
31 [...] daß ich meine Maxime im Gebrauche der 
Mittel zu jedem Zwecke auf die Bedingung 
ihrer Allgemeingültigkeit als eines Gesetzes für 
jedes Subjekt einschränken soll [...] 
… that in their use as means to any ends, I am to 
limit my maxims to the condition of their 
universal validity as a law for every subject … . 
438.04-07 
33 [...] daß jedes vernünftige Wesen als Zweck an 
sich selbst sich in Ansehung aller Gesetze, 
denen es nur immer unterworfen sein mag, 
zugleich als allgemein gesetzgebend müsse 
ansehen können [...] 
… that every rational being, as an end in itself, 
must only be able to see itself as at the same time 
universally lawmaking, with regard to any laws 
whatever to which it may be subject … . 
438.12-15 
34 Demnach muß ein jedes vernünftige Wesen so 
handeln, als ob es durch seine Maximen 
jederzeit ein gesetzgebendes Glied im 
allgemeinen Reiche der Zwecke wäre. 
Accordingly, each and every rational being must 
thus act as though it were, through its maxims, 
always a lawmaking member in a universal 
realm of ends. 
438.25-27 
35 Das Prinzip der Autonomie ist also: nicht 
anders zu wählen als so, daß die Maximen 
seiner Wahl in demselben Wollen zugleich als 
allgemeines Gesetz mit begriffen seien. 
The principle of autonomy is thus: not to choose 
otherwise than so that the maxims of its choice 
are at the same time comprehended as universal 
law in the same willing. 
440.20-23 
37 [D]ie Tauglichkeit der Maxime eines jeden 
guten Willens, sich selbst zum allgemeinen 
Gesetze zu machen, ist selbst das alleinige 
Gesetz, das sich der Wille eines jeden 
vernünftigen Wesens selbst auferlegt [...]. 
The suitability of the maxims of every good will 
to make itself into universal law is itself the only 
law that the will of every rational being imposes 
on itself … . 
444.35-38 
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38 [D]er Wille ist in allen Handlungen sich selbst 
ein Gesetz [...] 
[T]he will itself is a law in all actions … . 447.04-05 
39 [...] das Prinzip, nach keiner anderen Maxime 
zu handeln als die sich selbst auch als ein 
allgemeines Gesetz zum Gegenstande haben 
kann. 
… the principle to act according to no other 
maxim, than that which can also have for an 
object itself as universal law. 
447.05-08 
40 [E]in schlechterdings guter Wille ist derjenige, 
dessen Maxime jederzeit sich selbst, als 
allgemeines Gesetz betrachtet, in sich enthalten 
kann [...]. 
[A]n absolutely good will is one whose maxims 
always can always contain itself considered as 
universal law … . 
447.14-16 
41 [...] daß die subjektiven Grundsätze der 
Handlungen, d.i. Maximen jederzeit so 
genommen werden müssen, daß sie auch 
objektiv, d.i. allgemein als Grundsätze gelten, 
mithin zu unserer eigenen allgemeinen 
Gesetzgebung dienen können. 
… that the subjective principles of actions, i.e. 
maxims, must always be taken in such a way 
that they also count as objective, i.e. universal 
principles, and consequently can serve for our 
own universal legislation.  
449.10-14 
43 [...] so zu handeln, daß das Prinzip der 
Handlungen der wesentlich Beschaffenheit 
einer Vernunftursache, d.i. der Bedingung der 
Allgemeingültigkeit der Maxime als eines 
Gesetzes gemäß sei. 
… to act in such a way that the principle of 
actions is in accordance with the essential 
quality of a rational cause, i.e. with the condition 
of universal validity of the maxim as a law.  
458.15-18 
44 [...] macht den Begriff einer intelligibelen Welt 
[...] notwendig, [...] als bloß ihrer formalen 
Bedingung nach, d.i. der Allgemeinheit der 
Maxim des Willens als Gesetzes, mithin der 
Autonomie des letzteren [...]. 
… makes necessary the concept of an 
intelligible world, … as simply according to its 
formal condition, i.e. the universality of the 
maxim of the will as law, consequently the 
autonomy of the latter … . 
458.32-33, 
34, 35-36 
45 [S]o ist die Erklärung, wie und warum uns die 
Allgemeinheit der Maxime als Gesetzes, mithin 
die Sittlichkeit interessiere, uns Menschen 
gänzlich unmöglich. 
[T]hus the explanation of how and why the 
universality of the maxim as law, and 
consequently morality, would interest us, is 
entirely impossible for us human beings. 
460.26-29 
46 [W]ie das bloße Prinzip der Allgemeingültigkeit 
aller ihrer Maximen als Gesetze [...] für sich 
selbst eine Triebfeder abgeben [...]. 
[H]ow the simple principle of the universal 
validity of all of [human reason’s] maxims as 
law … by itself yields an incentive … . 
461.31-32, 
35-36 
47 Von der reinen Vernunft, [...] bleibt nach 
Absonderung aller Materie, d.i. Erkenntniß der 
Objecte mir nichts als die Form übrig, nämlich 
das praktische Gesetz der Allgemeingültigkeit 
der Maximen [...]. 
After culling all matter from pure reason, i.e. 
cognition of objects, nothing remains to me 
other than its form, namely the practical law of 
the universal validity of maxims … . 
462.15-16, 
16-17, 17-19 
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Table 4: 
 
Seven Intentional-Object Universal Law Formulations of 
the Moral Law in Kant’s Groundwork of the 
Metaphysic of Morals 
 
This table contains all universal law formulations that conceive rational 
deliberation as stipulating a particular intentional object of the will, 
rather than as a manner of willing. 
 
No. German English Citation 
GMS Ak. 04: 
1 [I]ch soll niemals anders verfahren als so, daß 
ich auch wollen könne, meine Maxime solle 
ein allgemeines Gesetz werden. 
I am never to proceed otherwise than such that 
I could also will that my maxim should 
become a universal law. 
402.09-11 
2 Kannst du auch wollen, daß deine Maxime 
ein allgemeines Gesetz werde? 
Can you also will that your maxim become a 
universal law? 
403.26-27 
4 [H]andle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch 
die du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie ein 
allgemeines Gesetz werde. 
Act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law. 
421.08-09 
6 Man muß wollen können, daß eine Maxime 
unserer Handlung ein allgemeines Gesetz 
werde [...]. 
One must be able to will that a maxim of our 
action become a universal law … . 
424.02-03 
15 [...] so kann er nur gebieten, alles aus der 
Maxime seines Willens als eines solchen zu 
tun, der zugleich sich selbst als allgemein 
gesetzgebend zum Gegenstand haben könnte 
[...] 
… it can only command to do everything 
from the maxims of its will as one that at the 
same time could have as its object itself as 
universally lawmaking … .  
432.23-25 
28 Handle nach Maximen, die sich selbst 
zugleich als allgemeine Naturgesetze zum 
Gegenstand haben können.  
Act according to maxims that can at the same 
time have as their object themselves as 
universal laws of nature 
437.21-23 
39 [...] das Prinzip, nach keiner anderen Maxime 
zu handeln als die sich selbst auch als ein 
allgemeines Gesetz zum Gegenstande haben 
kann. 
… the principle to act according to no other 
maxim, than that which can also have for an 
object itself as universal law. 
447.05-08 
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Table 5: 
 
24 Manner-of-Willing Universal Law Formulations of the 
Moral Law in Kant’s Groundwork of the 
Metaphysic of Morals 
 
This table contains all universal law formulations that conceive rational 
deliberation as a manner of willing rather than as stipulating a 
particular intentional object of the will. 
 
No. German English Citation 
GMS Ak. 04: 
3 [S]o bleibt nichts als die Allgemeinheit eines 
Gesetzes überhaupt übrig, welchem die 
Maxime der Handlung gemäß sein soll, und 
welche Gemäßheit allein der Imperative 
eigentlich als notwendig vorstellt. 
[N]othing remains to which the maxim of the 
action shall conform except the universality of 
a law in general; and which conformity alone 
the imperative actually represents as 
necessary. 
421.03-06 
5 [H]andle so, als ob die Maxime deiner 
Handlung durch deinen Willen z u m 
a l lgemeinen  Naturgese tze  werden 
sollte. 
So act as though the maxims of your action 
should become UNIVERSAL LAWS OF NATURE 
through your will. 
421.21-23 
7 [...] daß wir wirklich nicht wollen, es solle 
unsere Maxime ein allgemeines Gesetz 
werden, [...] 
… that we do not really will such that our 
maxim should become a universal law, . . . 
424.19-20 
10 [...] die Idee des Willens jedes vernünftigen 
Wesens als eines allgemein gesetzgebenden 
Willens. 
… the idea of the will of every rational being 
as a universal lawmaking will. 
431.20-22 
11 [...] die Idee des Willens eines jeden 
vernünftigen Wesens als 
allgemeingesetzgebenden Willens. 
… the idea of the will of each and every 
rational being as a universal lawmaking will.  
432.03-05 
12 [...] das Prinzip eines jeden menschlichen 
Willens als eines durch alle seine Maximen 
allgemein gesetzgebenden Willens [...]. 
… the principle of each and every human will 
as a will that makes universal law through all 
of its maxims … . 
432.14-16 
18 Der Begriff eines jeden vernünftigen Wesens, 
das sich durch alle Maximen seines Willens 
als allgemein gesetzgebend betrachten muß, 
[...]. 
The concept of each and every rational being 
that must consider itself as universally 
lawmaking through all of the maxims of its 
will … . 
433.15-17 
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19 [V]ernünftige Wesen stehen alle unter dem 
Gesetz, daß jedes derselben sich selbst und 
alles anderen niemals bloß als Mittel, sondern 
jederzeit zugleich als Zweck an sich selbst 
behandeln solle. 
All rational beings stand under the law that 
each of them should treat itself and every other 
never simply as means, but rather always at 
the same time as an end in itself. 
433.31-34 
21 [...] keine Handlung nach einer anderen 
Maxime zu tun als so, daß es auch mit ihr 
bestehen könne, daß sie ein allgemeines 
Gesetz sei, [...] 
… to perform no action according to any other 
maxim than such that it could be consistent 
with its being a universal law, … . 
434.12-14 
22 [...] und also nur so, daß der Wille durch seine 
Maxime sich selbst zugleich als allgemein 
gesetzgebend betrachten könne. 
… and thus only such that the will through its 
maxim could consider itself at the same time 
as universally lawmaking.  
434.14-16 
23 [...] daß die Maximen so müssen gewählt 
werden, als ob sie wie allgemeine 
Naturgesetze gelten sollten [...]. 
… that the maxims must be so chosen as 
though they should be valid as universal laws 
of nature … . 
436.19-21 
26 [H]andle nach der Maxime, die sich selbst 
zugleich zum allgemeinen Gesetze machen 
kann. 
Act according to the maxim that can make 
itself at the same time into a universal law.  
437.01-02 
27 [H]andle jederzeit nach derjenigen Maxime, 
deren Allgemeinheit als Gesetzes du zugleich 
wollen kannst [...]. 
Always act according to that maxim whose 
universality as law you can at the same time 
will … . 
437.12-14 
31 [...] daß ich meine Maxime im Gebrauche der 
Mittel zu jedem Zwecke auf die Bedingung 
ihrer Allgemeingültigkeit als eines Gesetzes 
für jedes Subjekt einschränken soll [...] 
… that in their use as means to any ends, I am 
to limit my maxims to the condition of their 
universal validity as a law for every subject … 
. 
438.04-07 
33 [...] daß jedes vernünftige Wesen als Zweck an 
sich selbst sich in Ansehung aller Gesetze, 
denen es nur immer unterworfen sein mag, 
zugleich als allgemein gesetzgebend müsse 
ansehen können [...] 
… that every rational being, as an end in itself, 
must only be able to see itself as at the same 
time universally lawmaking, with regard to 
any laws whatever to which it may be subject 
… . 
438.12-15 
34 Demnach muß ein jedes vernünftige Wesen 
so handeln, als ob es durch seine Maximen 
jederzeit ein gesetzgebendes Glied im 
allgemeinen Reiche der Zwecke wäre. 
Accordingly, each and every rational being 
must thus act as though it were, through its 
maxims, always a lawmaking member in a 
universal realm of ends. 
438.25-27 
35 Das Prinzip der Autonomie ist also: nicht 
anders zu wählen als so, daß die Maximen 
seiner Wahl in demselben Wollen zugleich als 
allgemeines Gesetz mit begriffen seien. 
The principle of autonomy is thus: not to 
choose otherwise than so that the maxims of 
its choice are at the same time comprehended 
as universal law in the same willing. 
440.20-23 
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37 [D]ie Tauglichkeit der Maxime eines jeden 
guten Willens, sich selbst zum allgemeinen 
Gesetze zu machen, ist selbst das alleinige 
Gesetz, das sich der Wille eines jeden 
vernünftigen Wesens selbst auferlegt [...]. 
The suitability of the maxims of every good 
will to make itself into universal law is itself 
the only law that the will of every rational 
being imposes on itself … . 
444.35-37 
40 [E]in schlechterdings guter Wille ist derjenige, 
dessen Maxime jederzeit sich selbst, als 
allgemeines Gesetz betrachtet, in sich 
enthalten kann [...]. 
[A]n absolutely good will is one whose 
maxims always can always contain itself 
considered as universal law … . 
447.14-16 
41 [...] daß die subjektiven Grundsätze der 
Handlungen, d.i. Maximen jederzeit so 
genommen werden müssen, daß sie auch 
objektiv, d.i. allgemein als Grundsätze gelten, 
mithin zu unserer eigenen allgemeinen 
Gesetzgebung dienen können. 
… that the subjective principles of actions, i.e. 
maxims, must always be taken in such a way 
that they also count as objective, i.e. universal 
principles, and consequently can serve for our 
own universal legislation.  
449.10-14 
43 [...] so zu handeln, daß das Prinzip der 
Handlungen der wesentlich Beschaffenheit 
einer Vernunftursache, d.i. der Bedingung der 
Allgemeingültigkeit der Maxime als eines 
Gesetzes gemäß sei. 
… to act in such a way that the principle of 
actions is in accordance with the essential 
quality of a rational cause, i.e. with the 
condition of universal validity of the maxim as 
a law.  
458.15-18 
44 [...] macht den Begriff einer intelligibelen Welt 
[...] notwendig, [...] als bloß ihrer formalen 
Bedingung nach, d.i. der Allgemeinheit der 
Maxim des Willens als Gesetzes, mithin der 
Autonomie des letzteren [...]. 
… makes necessary the concept of an 
intelligible world, … as simply according to its 
formal condition, i.e. the universality of the 
maxim of the will as law, consequently the 
autonomy of the latter … . 
458.32-33, 34, 
35-36 
46 [W]ie das bloße Prinzip der 
Allgemeingültigkeit aller ihrer Maximen als 
Gesetze [...] für sich selbst eine Triebfeder 
abgeben [...]. 
[H]ow the simple principle of the universal 
validity of all of [human reason’s] maxims as 
law … by itself yields an incentive … . 
461.31-32, 35-
36 
47 Von der reinen Vernunft, [...] bleibt nach 
Absonderung aller Materie, d.i. Erkenntniß der 
Objecte mir nichts als die Form übrig, nämlich 
das praktische Gesetz der Allgemeingültigkeit 
der Maximen [...]. 
After culling all matter from pure reason, i.e. 
cognition of objects, nothing remains to me 
other than its form, namely the practical law of 
the universal validity of maxims … . 
462.15-16, 16-
17, 17-19 
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Table 6: 
 
Seven Other Universal Law Formulations of the Moral Law 
in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 
 
This table contains all universal law formulations not otherwise sorted. All 
are in the indicative mood. 
 
No. German English Citation 
GMS Ak. 04: 
13 [...] daß es, eben um der Idee der allgemeinen 
Gesetzgebung willen, sich auf kein Interesse 
gründet und als unter allen möglichen 
Imperativen allein unbedingt sein kann [...] 
… precisely for the sake of universal 
legislation, it is not grounded on any interest 
and among all possible imperatives alone can 
be unconditioned … . 
432.17-20 
14 [...] wenn es einen kategorischen Imperativ 
gibt (d.i. ein Gesetz für jeden Willen eines 
vernünftigen Wesens) [...] 
… [i]f there is a categorical imperative (i.e. a 
law for every will of a rational being) … . 
432.21-23 
16 [...] daß er nur seiner eigenen und dennoch 
allgemeinen Gesetzgebung unterworfen sei  
[...] 
… that [the human being] is subject only to 
her own and yet universal legislation … . 
432.33-34 
17 [...] daß er nur verbunden sei, seinem eigenen, 
dem Naturzwecke nach aber allgemein 
gesetzgebenden Willen gemäß zu handeln. 
… that he is only bound to act according to 
natural ends, but in conformity with a 
universally lawmaking will. 
432.34-36 
30 [H]andle nach einer Maxime, die ihre eigene 
allgemeine Gültigkeit für jedes vernünftige 
Wesen zugleich in sich enthält [...]. 
Act according to a maxim that at the same 
time contains within itself its own universal 
validity for every rational being … . 
438.02-04 
38 [D]er Wille ist in allen Handlungen sich selbst 
ein Gesetz [...] 
[T]he will itself is a law in all actions … . 447.04-05 
45 [S]o ist die Erklärung, wie und warum uns die 
Allgemeinheit der Maxime als Gesetzes, 
mithin die Sittlichkeit interessiere, uns 
Menschen gänzlich unmöglich. 
[T]hus the explanation of how and why the 
universality of the maxim as law, and 
consequently morality, would interest us, is 
entirely impossible for us human beings. 
460.26-29 
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